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Articles
New Millennium, Same Glass Ceiling?
The Impact of Law Firm Compensation
Systems on Women†
Joan C. Williams∗ and Veta Richardson∗∗
This Article reports on a survey of 694 law firm partners, virtually all women, who filled
out an online survey about the impact of law firm compensation systems on women. The
results were analyzed through the lens of thirty-five years of experimental social
psychology studies of gender bias. Survey results showed considerable dissatisfaction
among women partners with respect to their firms’ partner compensation systems. Thirty
to forty percent of respondents were dissatisfied or extremely dissatisfied with their firm’s
system, and minority partners were more dissatisfied than majority ones. Many
respondents believed that their firms overvalued individual cash flow factors (origination,
revenue and billable hours) and undervalued institutional investment factors
(contributions to enhance the firm’s human capital), and that the systems lacked
transparency. Disputes over origination credit were very common, with minority
attorneys more likely than majority ones to experience them. About a quarter of majority
equity women partners, and a third of majority income and minority women partners
reported feeling “bullied, threatened or intimidated” in a dispute over origination credit.
Respondents’ reported experiences track patterns of gender bias as described in the
experimental literature. The Article ends with an extensive list of best practices to help
firms address the problems identified in law firm compensation systems.
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Introduction
The system is completely unfair and rewards white males and those
who are connected to those who are highly paid.
[Our compensation system is p]robably the fairest system out there.

These quotes summarize the good news and the bad news from the
Survey of Women Partners on Law Firm Compensation (“Survey of
1
Women Partners”) whose results are described in this Article. Some
respondents were satisfied with their compensation and felt that their
firms’ compensation systems were eminently fair. Other respondents
were dissatisfied and felt their compensation systems were very unfair.
Professional women have the largest gender wage gap in the entire
economy: They earn proportionately less, as compared with professional
2
men, than do women in non-professional jobs. The legal profession
provides a stark example: While the wage gap between male and female
engineers has evaporated, the wage gap between men and women in the
3
law remains robust. A 2009 study of lawyers found clear evidence of a

1. Unless otherwise cited, the responses quoted in this Article are from responses given during
the course of the survey. The quotations have been verified by the Authors against the primary source,
and the responses and corresponding data are on file with the Authors.
2. See Trond Petersen & Laurie A. Morgan, Separate and Unequal: Occupation-Establishment
Sex Segregation and the Gender Wage Gap, 101 Am. J. Soc. 329, 355 (1995).
3. See Ronit Dinovitzer, Nancy Reichman & Joyce Sterling, The Differential Valuation of
Women’s Work: A New Look at the Gender Gap in Lawyers’ Incomes, 88 Soc. Forces 819, 843, 847–48
(2009).
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continued gender gap among lawyers working full time in private
4
practice who were otherwise similarly situated.
Rigorous studies have suggested that law firm compensation
systems probably play a role in the persistence of the gender gap in the
law. For example, a 2004 study by Nancy Reichman and Joyce Sterling
found that women lawyers were more likely to be dissatisfied with their
compensation than were men: 14% of the women, but none of the men,
rated their compensation systems as being on the bottom of a seven-rung
5
scale. Only about half of women (51%), but closer to three-fourths of
6
the men (71%), reported high levels of satisfaction.
Happily, the gender gap in law firm compensation has decreased in
recent years. According to one study, women partners narrowed the
7
gender gap in compensation from 69% in 1993 to 78% in 1999. Yet two
studies by the National Association of Women Lawyers (“NAWL”)
found that dramatic pay differentials persist. NAWL’s 2009 report found
women equity partners typically earning about $66,000 less than their
8
male counterparts —an improvement over the $87,000 differential they
9
found in 2008, probably due to overall declines in compensation caused
10
by the Great Recession. The wage gap among income partners also
remains substantial: In 2009, male income partners averaged $25,000
11
more than female income partners. Another factor depressing the
compensation of women partners is that women, as a group, take longer
12
to attain the rank of equity partner than do men.
The most common explanations for differentials between male and
female partners are that women’s family responsibilities mean that they
do not spend the hours necessary to develop business, or that they are
13
more likely to go into less lucrative legal specialties. While no studies of
gender differentials in partner compensation are available, one study
4. Id. at 843.
5. Nancy J. Reichman & Joyce S. Sterling, Sticky Floors, Broken Steps, and Concrete Ceilings in
Legal Careers, 14 Tex. J. Women & L. 27, 46–47 (2004).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 37.
8. Nat’l Ass’n of Women Lawyers & NAWL Found., Report of the Fourth Annual
National Survey on Retention and Promotion of Women in Law Firms 11–12 (2009) [hereinafter
NAWL, 2009 Report].
9. Nat’l Ass’n of Women Lawyers & NAWL Found., Report of the Third Annual National
Survey on Retention and Promotion of Women in Law Firms 13–14 (2008).
10. Bernard Burk & David McGowan, Schumpeter, Coase and the Future of the (Law) Firm
1 (Mar. 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Georgetown Law Center for the Study of
the Legal Profession), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/LegalProfession/documents/
BurkMcGowan.pdf.
11. NAWL, 2009 Report, supra note 8, at 11.
12. Id. at 8.
13. See, e.g., Mary C. Noonan, Mary E. Corcoran & Paul N. Courant, Is the Partnership Gap
Closing for Women? Cohort Differences in the Sex Gap in Partnership Chances, 37 Soc. Sci. Res. 156,
157–58 (2007).
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discounted these explanations for why men are more likely to become
partners—at a rate that has not decreased since women entered the law
14
in significant numbers in the late 1970s. “Male graduates are more likely
than female graduates to be partners even when men and women have
comparable career plans, law school GPAs, marital status, parental
status, work histories, and legal specializations. Sex also strongly predicts
partnership among” lawyers, a correlation that remains robust even
among more recent law school graduates, conclude Mary Noonan, Mary
15
Corcoran, and Paul Courant.
The 2009 study by Ronit Dinovitzer, Nancy Reichman, and Joyce
Sterling found that the wage gap among young lawyers preparing for
partnership does not result from the human capital women bring to their
16
“Lifestyle”
careers, or from their childrearing responsibilities.
17
considerations result in a modest narrowing of the gender gap. A much
larger factor is what sociologists call “opportunity paths”: networking
18
opportunities and the ability to work on career-enhancing assignments.
“These findings confirm that in professional settings such as law firms,
where work assignments travel from senior to more junior employees,
socializing with more senior lawyers in both work and non-work settings
19
can directly affect earnings.” The study found that the field of law also
contributes to the gender gap: “[T]he gender wage gap we find in our
research signals that there may be something unique in the early
professional work of lawyers that allows for the kind of subjective
assessments and interactions that underlie differences in pay and account
20
for significant within-occupation wage gaps.”
Forty years ago, most large law firms had no more than a few
21
hundred attorneys, along with lockstep compensation systems. Lockstep
systems both assumed and created a symbiosis between “finders, minders
and grinders”: attorneys whose skill set rested on finding new clients,
attorneys who were best at binding existing clients to the firm through
attentive relationship skills, and attorneys who produced the high-quality
22
legal work that fed the whole machine. Most large firms had stable
long-term relationships with institutional clients whom everyone—both
attorneys and clients—assumed would not change firms absent dramatic

14. Id. at 173–76.
15. Id. at 170–71.
16. Dinovitzer, Reichman & Sterling, supra note 3, at 846–47.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 847.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 848 (citation omitted).
21. See Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, Tournaments of Lawyers: The Transformation of
the Big Law Firm 22, 42 (1991).
22. See id. at 52 n.109.
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23

misbehavior. Nor did partners leave their firms: this was frowned upon,
24
and consequently rare. Moreover, in all but a few firms, lawyers made
very high middle-class salaries but did not expect to move into the ranks
25
of the truly wealthy.
Today, much has changed. As investment banking salaries exploded
in the 1990s, large-firm New York lawyers’ salary expectations rose
sharply: Top partners looked at the millions their clients were making,
and asked themselves why their salaries were not equivalent. This began
a cycle in which the ratio between the highest- and lowest-paid partners
climbed sharply. In mid-sized firms, top partners now average six times
26
the compensation of their firms’ lowest-paid partners. In large firms, the
27
ratio is now about 10:1. Said one survey respondent, “[After a merger,]
most of the partners were effectively de-equitized. . . . All this was done
to increase profits per partner and to consolidate income in a select top
tier of partners.”
For complex reasons, probably related in part to lawyers’ exploding
salary expectations, corporate clients became far more willing to demand
28
value and to change firms. This made rainmakers much more important.
As rainmakers’ power increased, the taboo on changing firms
29
evaporated. The result is the current compensation system, which
dramatically overvalues “finding,” and dramatically undervalues
“minding” and “grinding”—that oddly dismissive term for doing highquality legal work.
A 2009 Altman Weil survey of law firm compensation found that
individual performance factors account for 64% of law firm
30
compensation. Another 27%, which goes into the bonus distribution
31
pool, probably often also goes disproportionately to rainmakers. The
study author concludes:
That leaves less than 10% weighting to teamwork in practices,
departments and offices. If the “talk” is collaborative and encouraging
of team behaviors, then clearly the “walk” of compensation is not
32
aligned with those aspirations.

23. Id. at 43, 48, 57 n.68.
24. See id. at 23–24, 28–29.
25. See id. at 52.
26. Joel A. Rose, Firms Rethink Partners’ Pay as Leverage Declines, Joel A. Rose & Assocs.,
Inc., http://www.joelarose.com/articles/rethink_partners_pay.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2011).
27. Increasing Margins: Experts’ Views of What Works Now with Partner Compensation Plans,
Partner’s Report for Law Firm Owners, June 2005, at 1, 13 (on file with the Author).
28. Galanter & Palay, supra note 21, at 48–50.
29. See Burk & McGowan, supra note 10, at 10–11.
30. James D. Cotterman, Law Firm Compensation Practices Update, Rep. to Legal Mgmt.,
July/Aug. 2009, at 1, 9 (Altman Weil, Inc.).
31. Id.
32. Id.
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Consultants wax purple on the perverse incentives built into the
current system. Overvaluation of billable hours leads to the hoarding of
work, with the consequent failure to match work to the attorney (a) with
the relevant skill set, who (b) can deliver a high-quality product in the
33
most cost-efficient fashion. Overvaluation of rainmaking also leads to
dissatisfaction among attorneys—men as well as women—who keep the
clients happy, both through relationship-building and by providing high34
quality legal work. Lost in the shuffle, too, are the tasks that new larger
law firms need to survive and thrive as institutions. As consultants have
identified, law firms undervalue both teamwork and the kinds of
institutional investments that are vital to the long-term viability of any
business organization.
This Article combines a review of these studies and the existing
literature on attorney compensation with extensive research into
experimental studies of gender bias in order to discuss the results of the
Survey of Women Partners. The survey was administered from July 13,
2009 to November 22, 2009 and was completed by 694 respondents.
Fourteen percent of respondents were racial or ethnic minorities. Among
our minority-partner respondents, 53% were equity partners, while 43%
35
were income partners. Generally, minority equity and minority income
partners’ responses will be reported separately. However, the responses
for both groups are aggregated in instances where there is no significant
difference between the two, or when the numbers for any one response
category are so small (less than ten) as to compromise the anonymity of
the respondents. Our sample is overwhelmingly female: 99% of equityand income-partner respondents and 97% of minority respondents were
women. This stemmed from a deliberate decision, due to budgetary
constraints, to limit our outreach to women. The result is that we can
draw conclusions, based on our data, about what women report, but we
cannot compare women’s impressions with those of men. An important
point is that, to avoid awkwardness in the text, we have generally
referred to “equity partners,” rather than using more precise
formulations, such as “women equity-partner respondents.” Yet all of
the survey data here represents findings about women lawyers, not the
larger universe of lawyers.
Our survey respondents were more likely than lawyers in general
are to be in large law firms: Roughly three-fourths of our respondents

33. Id.; see James D. Cotterman, Examining Your Compensation System, Rep. to Legal Mgmt.,
Apr. 2003, at 1, 5–6 (Altman Weil, Inc.).
34. Cotterman, supra note 30; see Cotterman, supra note 33.
35. Ninety-four respondents reported being a racial or ethnic minority. Of these respondents,
thirty-six indicated being equity partners, and twenty-nine indicated being income partners. The
survey instrument did not define the terms “income partner” and “equity partner.” Respondents were
left to make their own interpretations of the terms—which can differ between firms.
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were in firms of over 250 attorneys, as compared with 26.4% of lawyers
36
in the U.S. who are in private practice. Fifteen percent of our
respondents were in medium-sized firms (defined as 100 to 250
attorneys). Our sample was less likely than U.S. lawyers in general to
work in small firms of one-to-five attorneys: Only 4% worked in firms of
ten or fewer attorneys.
Our respondents also were less likely than were U.S. lawyers in
general to be in very small firms of five lawyers or less. Overall, the
majority of the sample was in multipractice and litigation firms (86%).
Majority equity-partner respondents (91%) were more likely than
majority income partners (81%) or minority equity partners (86%) to be
in multipractice and litigation firms. Minority income partners were least
likely to be in multipractice and litigation firms (69%). Although
litigation-only firms were represented by only 4% of the sample,
minority partners (7%) were more likely than majority equity (3%) or
income partners (5%) to be in firms that do only litigation. Majority
equity partners (6%) were less likely than majority income (13%) and
minority (12%) partners to be in boutique firms with specialty practices.
Our income-partner respondents were about as likely as equity
partners to be in law firms whose footprints are regional; they were more
likely to be in national firms, and less likely to be in international ones.
Minority partners were more likely than partners in general to be in
firms with international footprints, slightly more likely to be at regional
37
firms, and less likely to be in national firms.
The Article first documents the major findings of the Survey of
Women Partners, beginning with a discussion of who composes the
committees that make compensation decisions at most firms—
committees that respondents’ found to lack diversity. Next it provides
the survey results on respondents’ overall satisfaction with existing
compensation systems, noting that fewer than half of equity partners and
only about one-third of income and minority partners report being
satisfied with their compensation systems. The Article then identifies the
factors that are perceived to be important—and not important—in
setting law firm compensation, raising issues of lack of transparency, gaps
between policy and practice, and problematic measures of personal
“partner productivity” (in other words, billable hours, cash flow metrics,
committee ratings, and institutional investment). The Article then
38
addresses the issue of origination credit, including how it is allocated

36. See Gita Z. Wilder, NALP Found. for Law Career Research & Educ., Women in the
Profession: Findings from the First Wave of the After the JD Study 9 (2007).
37. See infra Appendix.
38. The term “origination” or “origination credit” generally refers to the credit toward
compensation that a lawyer receives for bringing a client or new business into the firm. See, e.g., James
D. Cotterman, Recognizing Origination, Rep. to Legal Mgmt., Nov./Dec. 2009, at 1, 8 (Altman Weil,
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and how disputes over origination can be painful. After identifying
findings that discount the assumption that compensation is tied to
women having less time for rainmaking, the Article presents additional
issues in compensation systems that lead to gender inequity, including
lack of succession planning, subjectivity, the impact of self-advocacy on
women, and the concept of de-equitized partners.
The Article then moves on to address possible solutions in light of
the study’s findings. It first identifies the economic realities upon which
any law firm compensation system must be grounded, and then
concludes by providing nine concrete best practices that can foster
greater gender equality in law firm compensation.

I. Findings
This study’s findings address the overall satisfaction of women
partners, minority and majority, and establish a significant correlative
relationship between partner satisfaction, the understanding of how a
firm determines compensation, the billable hours threshold, and the
allocation of origination credit. The level of subjectivity inherent in the
compensation system also factors into partner success and satisfaction
and serves as an indicator of the potential for gender bias to be present in
the system.
A. Who Makes Compensation Decisions?
The inner circle of white male lawyers, whether they bring in business
or not, generally do much better in the firm compensation system than
the female lawyers.

A key factor in assessing the gender gap in law firm compensation is
that law firm partnership ranks remain overwhelming male. In 2009, only
16% of equity partners and 27% of income partners were women,
despite the fact that over 30% of law school graduates have been women
39
since 1980, and that as of 2000, one-half were women. The
underrepresentation of women among law firm equity partners has a
profound influence on compensation decisionmaking. The most obvious
influence concerns who makes the compensation decisions.
Respondents were asked to list all parties who play a role in setting
compensation at their firms. Little difference emerged among the
40
different groups of respondents. The most common answer (39-40%)
was that a management or executive committee made overall
compensation decisions, as well as decisions regarding the salaries of

Inc.).
39. NAWL, 2009 Report, supra note 9, at 7.
40. No difference was noted from the disaggregation of minority respondents into income and
equity partners.
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income partners (35-40%), the compensation of equity partners (4042%), and whether bonuses are distributed and who gets them (37-39%).
Next most common (22-27%) were systems where a separate
compensation committee determined overall compensation levels as well
as the compensation of income and equity partners, with compensation
committees being the most likely to set the compensation of income
partners (27%) but less likely to set the compensation of equity and
minority partners (22-23%).
Nearly as many respondents said that the managing partner, chair or
president set overall compensation levels at their firms, although
considerably fewer income (14%) than equity partners (19-20%) reported
this system.
Practice group leaders played a role in setting income, draws, and
bonuses at 12% or less of our respondents’ firms. Partner vote played a
role in 7% or less of respondents’ firms.
The committees that decide compensation tended to have between
five and ten members, although some had thirty-one or more members.
Membership on the compensation or other key committee was most
commonly determined by election by the partnership: 34% of equity
partners and 23% of income partners reported this kind of system. The
next most common system was appointment by the chair or equivalent,
reported by 28% of equity partners and 23% of income partners. Next
most common were systems that included a combination of elected and
appointed members, reported by 14% of equity partners, and 17% of
income partners. Comments on the surveys indicated that, in some firms,
elections are pro forma, in that a preselected panel is typically or
invariably elected.
The only major difference between women minority and majority
partners was that minority partners were considerably more likely to be
in firms in which compensation decisions were made by a combination of
elected and appointed committee members: 26% of minority partners
were, as compared to 14% of equity and 17% of income partners.
In addition, minority representation on the committee in charge of
compensation often was low or nonexistent. As shown in Figure 1, the
compensation committee had no minority women in nearly 90% of
majority respondents’ firms and in nearly 80% of minority respondents’
firms. Compensation committees had no minority men in roughly 75% of
minority respondents’ firms, and 71% of majority respondents’ firms.
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Figure 1: Compensation Committee Composition: Numbers of Minority
Women and Minority Men by Minority Status of Partner

Representation of women on compensation committees also was
low. About half of respondents had one woman on their compensation
committees. One-fifth had none. Another fifth had two women on their
compensation committees, as shown in Figure 2. Said one respondent,
“We have only one woman on our management committee, and one
woman group head—which is disturbing.” Three respondents disclosed
that they serve on their firms’ compensation committees. Research shows
that one woman serving on a committee of men can give rise to tokenism
dynamics that negatively affect both the woman herself and her ability to
41
influence decisionmaking. Minority partners were slightly more likely to
be at firms with no women on their compensation committees and were
slightly less likely to be at firms with one woman on their committees.
Figure 2: Compensation Committee Composition: Majority Women by
Minority Status of Partner

Out lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgendered lawyers also are rare on
compensation committees, as shown in Figure 3.

41. Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Men and Women of the Corporation 238–39 (1993).
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Figure 3: Compensation Committee Composition: Number LBGT by
Minority Status of Partner

In short, our respondents’ perception was that, at many firms, the
committees that decide law firm compensation often are startlingly
lacking in diversity. Data on law firm committee assignments suggests
that powerful compensation and management committees are much
more likely to be staffed by men. NAWL’s Fourth Annual Survey on
Retention and Promotion of Women reports that “about 14% of the
nation’s largest firms have no women at all on their governing
42
committees.” The average percentage of female members on the largest
firms’ governing committees has not changed substantially in the last
43
four years.
Equity partners reported that compensation or executive committees
were most likely to have responsibility for compensation decisions (3842%), with special compensation committees (20-23%) and firm leaders
(19-21%) roughly half as likely to play a role. Income partners were
slightly more likely than equity partners to report participation by a
special compensation committee (26-29%) and slightly less likely to
report participation by firm leaders (14-16%). Among minority
attorneys, firm leaders were more likely (17-21%) and the management
or executive committee was less likely (35-40%) to play a role in
44
compensation.
Having practice group leaders involved in compensation decisions
was a much less common practice: 8-12% of equity partners, 7-14% of

42. NAWL, 2009 Report, supra note 9, at 2.
43. Id. at 5; see also Laura R. Hammargren, Comment, Servant Leadership and Women in the
Law: A New Nexus of Women, Leadership and the Legal Profession, 4 U. St. Thomas L.J. 624, 634
(2007) (“[D]espite women’s equal parity in law school and entrance to the profession, gender
composition at law firms has remained 70% male since 1997 and leadership percentages are even
worse. The most compelling number reflecting the stagnancy of women advancement is the 18% of
women equity partners that did not grow or expand from 2000 to 2005.” (footnotes omitted)).
44. No difference was noted from the disaggregation of minority income and minority equity
partners.
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income partners, and 8-10% of minority partners reported involvement
of practice group leaders in setting bonuses and the salaries of income
partners. Practice group leaders were very rarely involved in setting the
compensation of equity partners.
The demographics of law firm partnerships, and of the committees
and individuals in charge of compensation, pave the way for a pattern
45
called in-group favoritism. In-group favoritism flips the common image
that gender bias discriminates against women. In-group favoritism is a
potentially powerful form of bias that discriminates in favor of men. Ingroup favoritism tends to be strongest when men greatly outnumber
women, because then gender is salient—it jumps out as unavoidably
apparent. In addition, subjective and highly discretionary decisionmaking,
which describes most law firm compensation systems, can exacerbate in46
group favoritism.
47
People automatically prefer people like them. They feel more
comfortable with them, more obligated to them, more loyal to them.
48
They impute positive attributes, trust them, remember their positive
traits while forgetting their negative ones, and favor them in distributing
49
rewards. When men are the in-group, men—but not women—tend to be
given the benefit of the doubt. Objective rules tend to be applied rigidly
50
to women but leniently to men.
45. Robin J. Ely, The Power in Demography: Women’s Social Constructions of Gender Identity at
Work, 38 Acad. Mgmt. J. 589, 625 (1995) (“In firms in which few women were in positions of power,
sex roles were more stereotypical and more problematic. Women in these firms, when compared to
women in firms with higher proportions of senior women, . . . evaluated feminine attributes . . . less
favorably in relation to their firm’s requirements for success . . . .”); see also Paul R. Sackett et al.,
Tokenism in Performance Evaluation: The Effects of Work Group Representation on Male-Female and
White-Black Differences in Performance Ratings, 76 J. Applied Psychol. 263, 266 (1991) (“[W]omen
are rated about half a standard deviation lower than men when women make up less than 20% of the
group. When women make up more than 50% of the work group, they are in fact rated more highly
than men.”).
46. See William T. Bielby, Minimizing Workplace Gender and Racial Bias, 29 Contemp. Soc. 120,
123 (2000) (“[P]ersonnel systems whose criteria for making decisions are arbitrary and subjective are
highly vulnerable to bias due to the influence of stereotypes . . . . A high degree of segregation in such
a system is usually a strong indicator that ascriptive traits are strongly influencing personnel
decisions . . . .” (internal citation omitted)); Daniel J. Brass, Men’s and Women’s Networks: A Study of
Interaction Patterns and Influence in an Organization, 28 Acad. Mgmt. J. 327, 339–40 (1985) (“Men
and women appeared to build networks equally well, although each gender tended to interact with
itself. . . . The result of this segregation was that women were less central to men’s networks, in
particular the interaction network of the dominant coalition. Access to this group of high-level men
was very strongly related to influence for the women employees and was significantly related to
promotions for the entire sample.”).
47. James N. Baron & Jeffrey Pfeffer, The Social Psychology of Organizations and Inequality,
57 Soc. Psychol. Q. 190, 192 (1994).
48. Charles W. Perdue et al., Us and Them: Social Categorization and the Process of Intergroup
Bias, 59 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 475, 478 (1990) (“In-group words demonstrated the potential
to imbue neutral stimuli with positive connotation by simply being concurrently presented.”).
49. Baron & Pfeffer, supra note 47, at 192, 198.
50. See, e.g., id. at 198–99 (“The available evidence is quite clear that work performed by women
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In-group favoritism does not mean that all men are in the in-group.
In a typical law firm, the pattern instead means that, although some men
are excluded from the in-group, most members of the in-group are white
men. Said one respondent, who commented that it helps to know and be
known. “White men seem to fare best on this, but not all white men do
well—but of people who do well, almost all (maybe all) are white men.”
Some respondents expressed a high opinion of those committees’
work. Said one, “I think the compensation committee works very hard,
makes tough decisions equitably and tried to do the right thing.” Yet
floods of comments by other respondents demonstrated the effects of ingroup favoritism when asked what factors played an important role in
their compensation systems:
• “Anomalies are visible in the firm’s compensation patterns. Most
partners attribute this to whether you are in the chairman’s inner
circle or not.”
• “Partners who have the support of powerful partners are [more highly]
compensated than other partners with the same metrics.”
• “Being part of the ‘in crowd.’”
• “Personal relationships with power partners.”
• “If a powerful partner cares about your compensation.”
• “Seniority plays no role but having a cheerleader, particularly if that
cheerleader sits on the management committee, can play a huge role.”
• “Whether you are supported, well liked, etc. by partners with
significant clout.”
• “Although the starting point of the discussions is an objective one,
subjective judgment of the senior management plays a huge
role . . . . It is staggering how two partners who are similarly situated
on paper can end up in very different organizational tiers, and how
people in the same tier can be incomparable on paper. Political
relationships and history with the firm are significant, although
unspoken, factors.”
• “It is primarily based on client base and billings but the firm also
considers contribution to firm operations and management and other
subjective factors, such as whether one of the partners on the
compensation committee personally supports or favors you.”

Some respondents felt that members of the relevant committee took care
of themselves: “Somehow members of the Executive Committee (who
make the decisions) and the Practice Group Leaders seem to be the most
is valued less highly than comparable work done by men.”); Marilynn B. Brewer, The Social
Psychology of Intergroup Relations: Can Research Inform Practice?, 53 J. Soc. Issues 197, 205 (1997)
(“[W]e-they distinctions . . . produce differential evaluation, liking, and treatment of other persons
depending on whether they are identified as members of the ingroup category or not.”); Marilynn
Brewer & Rupert J. Brown, Intergroup Relations, in 2 Handbook of Social Psychology 554, 554
(Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske & Gardner Lindzey eds., 1998); Perdue et al., supra note 48, at 482
(“Our three experiments indicated that . . . “us” and “them,” together with other collective pronouns,
may perpetuate and possibly transfer in-group-related biases to evaluations of other people.”).
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highly compensated and seldom lose ground . . . during their tenure on
the Committee.” Another respondent noted that being in the in-group
not only translated directly into higher compensation, but also paved the
way to management positions that could do so:
• “Being a friend of managing partners seems to translate into higher
compensation. It also leads to management positions, which can be
leveraged into higher compensation.”
• “The problem with the questions is that some of these criteria
are . . . relied on by the management to reward themselves and those
they want to reward, but not others.”

In an environment where women and people of color are
underrepresented, both among partners and on the committees that
make compensation decisions, in-group favoritism opens the door to
gender and race bias. Again, comments abound:
• “Getting someone from the 97% male group that really runs the firm
to advocate for you.”
• “It’s mostly a ‘good old boy’ system.”
• “When you see the distribution of compensation among partners, it
has the appearance of a solid old boys’ network.”
• “Also includes total hours and subjective criteria and old boy
relationships.”
• “As an unwritten principle, whether you are one of the ‘boys.’”
• “I was the highest paid woman in my office, and my compensation was
about 50% less than any . . . male partner in my department in my
office. There was significant backlash as a result of my sexual
orientation internally.”

Extensive literature documents what everyone knows: People tend to
associate with people like them. This is not news, but if job benefits are
51
then distributed through males’ network ties, gender bias can appear. In
addition, in a context where decisionmaking involves secrecy and
complex sets of often countervailing factors, in-group favoritism is more
52
likely to have an influence.
Sometimes gender creeps in not only because law firms are
predominantly male, but also because more senior attorneys are. A few
respondents expressed sentiments to the effect that “senior partners
were compensat[ed] unfairly vis-à-vis junior partners.” One added, “Of
course, this is a gender concern as well because there are far fewer senior
women partners.”

51. For a review of the literature on how gender shapes workplace networks, see Gail M.
McGuire, Gender, Race, and the Shadow Structure: A Study of Informal Networks and Inequality in a
Work Organization, 16 Gender & Soc’y 303 (2002).
52. See, e.g., Gerald R. Salancik & Jeffrey Pfeffer, Uncertainty, Secrecy, and the Choice of Similar
Others, 41 Soc. Psychol. 246, 246 (1978) (discussing how secrecy and conflicting criteria tend to fuel
in-group favoritism).
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Another respondent identified not only male networks, but also
masculine assumptions and ideals as being disadvantageous to women:
“Origination is skewed by (1) historical firm client control (typically
male), (2) individual partner generosity or lack of [the] same in
attributing origination to others when multiple efforts have gone into
attracting and keeping a client (more powerful partners (usually male)
may claim origination without challenge from others). The final piece
of compensation is entirely subjective—board’s discretion to consider
special circumstances deserving additional comp—male dominated
ideas of measuring value and what is ‘special.’”

Some respondents felt their firms crossed the line into outright gender
discrimination:
• “Pure gender—women are paid less, period, although management
would deny this.”
• “Law firm compensation at most firms in the AmLaw [American
Lawyer] Top 50 is a per se violation of [federal law].”

Other comments do not identify reasons but express their sense that men
clearly make more than women:
• “Across the board, men make more than women in the firm’s NYC
office.”
• “It is hard to say that gender is not a factor, when the median
compensation for male partners is almost double that of female
partners in my department, which is the largest department in a large
international law firm. Once bonuses (which are confidential) are
factored in, it is my informed belief that women partners in my
practice group make less than half as much as the male partners.”
• “I do not believe the firm could withstand a fairness audit that applied
more objective criteria to compensation. We will never know, but
most women partners believe their compensation is less than male
counterparts’.”
• “Attorneys who put in many hours or bring in an important case are
typically awarded bonuses. However, the firm has discriminated and
used bonuses to pay certain women and gay men so that they do not
have to increase the ‘base compensation’ of the partner. This is
important because the partnership agreement provides that a partner’s
comp cannot drop more than 25% per year. By awarding bonuses
instead of additional comp, the firm does not have to commit to
paying a high salary next year. The bonus was used in such a
discriminatory way one year that a woman partner filed a claim
against the firm, arbitrated it (won), and left the firm.”

At some firms, problems surrounding compensation appear to be part of
a larger problem. Said one respondent:
“At this firm, women are almost never asked to go on a pitch unless it
is to a female. We also get no referrals from male attorneys other than
the men we worked with at our previous firm who moved with us to
this firm. I have had to tell men not to call me ‘dear’ and ‘kiddo’ and
they have been insulted by that. And our compensation and bonuses
are clearly not the same.”
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B. Overall Satisfaction
Somewhat under half (47%) of equity-partner respondents were
satisfied or extremely satisfied with their annual compensation in relation
to their partner peers, as compared with approximately 35% of income
53
partners. Among minority attorneys, approximately equal proportions
indicated they were “satisfied” or “extremely satisfied” as those who
indicated they were “dissatisfied” or “extremely dissatisfied” (36% and
37%, respectively). Majority equity partners were considerably more likely
than were majority income partners and minority partners to be “satisfied”
or “extremely satisfied.” Conversely, majority equity partners are less
likely to indicate dissatisfaction or extreme dissatisfaction than were
income partners and minority partners.
Table 1: Are You Satisfied with Your Annual Compensation in
Relation to Your PARTNER PEERS?

1. Satisfied or
extremely satisfied
2. Dissatisfied or
extremely dissatisfied

Majority
Equity
Partners

Majority
Income
Partners

Minority
Partners

50%

39%

36%

31%

38%

37%

Equity-partner respondents were about as likely to be “satisfied” or
“extremely satisfied” with their bonuses as they were with their
54
compensation (48%). They were less likely (27%) to be “dissatisfied” or
“extremely dissatisfied” (as opposed to “mixed” or “neutral”). Minority
partners were less likely to be “satisfied” or “extremely satisfied” (34%)
with their bonuses than they were with their compensation. Minority
partners were near equally balanced between those who were “satisfied”
or “extremely satisfied” (34%) and those who were “dissatisfied” or
“extremely dissatisfied” (33%), reflecting the fact that minority-partner
respondents were about equally split between income and equity partners.
These satisfaction rates with the frequency and/or amounts of their
bonuses were about the same as their satisfaction rates with their overall
55
compensation. Among majority respondents, only 27% of income
partners were “satisfied” or “extremely satisfied” with their bonus
amounts, whereas 51% of equity partners were “satisfied” or “extremely
satisfied.”

53. This data is not reflected in Table 1 infra.
54. This data is not reflected in Table 1 supra.
55. See supra note 55.
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Respondents were less sanguine that their compensation systems
were applied consistently from year to year. Equity partners had more
confidence about this than did the other two groups: About one-third were
“satisfied” or “extremely satisfied.” The two other groups were distinctly
dubious: Only about one in four minority (25%) and income partners
(26%) reported being “satisfied” or “extremely satisfied” about year-toyear consistency. Among majority respondents, a greater proportion of
equity partners than income partners were “satisfied” or “extremely
satisfied” that their compensation system is applied consistently (40% and
30%, respectively).
Table 2: Are You “Satisfied” or “Extremely Satisfied” That Your
Compensation System Is Applied Consistently from YEAR TO YEAR?

1. Satisfied or
extremely satisfied
2. Dissatisfied or
extremely
dissatisfied

Majority
Equity Partners

Majority
Income
Partners

Minority
Partners

40%

30%

25%

38%

42%

51%

Satisfaction levels fell again when respondents were asked about
satisfaction that their firms’ compensation systems were applied
consistently from partner to partner. About one in three equity partners
were satisfied or extremely satisfied, as compared to one in five income
partners and one in four minority partners. Once again, minority
partners looked more like income than equity partners.
Table 3: Are You “Satisfied” or “Extremely Satisfied” That Your
Compensation System Is Applied Consistently from PARTNER TO
PARTNER?

1. Satisfied or
extremely satisfied
2. Dissatisfied or
extremely
dissatisfied

Majority Equity
Partners

Majority
Income
Partners

Minority
Partners

36%

24%

22%

45%

54%

56%

In summary, about half of the equity-partner respondents were
satisfied or extremely satisfied with their compensation and bonuses,
while only one-in-three was satisfied or extremely satisfied that their
compensation systems were applied consistently from year to year and
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from one partner to the next. Not surprisingly, income partners were less
likely to be satisfied or extremely satisfied than were equity partners.
Unfortunately, in this exploratory study we are not able to compare
these levels of satisfaction with the satisfaction rates of male partners.
However, the finding that between 35% and 44% of respondents were
satisfied or extremely satisfied with their compensation is lower than that
of the Reichman and Sterling study, which found that 51% of women but
71% of male lawyers reported high levels of satisfaction with their
56
compensation systems. This is not surprising, given that the earlier study
assessed the satisfaction of law firm associates as well as partners during
an era when most law firms paid associates in lockstep. This meant that
the women associates typically were getting the same compensation as
the men, which would naturally create a situation in which women
associates were more satisfied with their compensation systems than
were women partners.
Our data also allow us to draw some conclusions about racial
differences in satisfaction rates among women law firm partners.
Although slightly over half of the minority-partner respondents (55%)
were equity partners, the minority-partner respondents were far closer to
income partners than to equity partners in terms of their overall
satisfaction with their firms’ compensation systems, and with their firms’
compensation systems’ consistency from partner to partner and from
year to year than were partners in general. This racial difference in
satisfaction rates is an important finding, although further study is
needed to ascertain whether this pattern holds among men.
C. What Factors Are Important in Setting Law Firm Compensation?
The firm gives lip service, when evaluating for compensation, to firm
management activities, committee work, participation in non-billable
events, but it seems they are unevenly applied in order to justify the
subjective whims of the evaluators . . . . Management activities are not
compensated for; leadership is not, mentoring is not, and attorneys
who are good billers, but do poorly in these areas, or are destructive
factors, are nonetheless rewarded without any effort at correction.

Huge majorities of our respondents did not believe that their firms
take into account the right combination of factors when determining
compensation. Only about one in three equity partners (32%), one in six
income partners (16%), and slightly less than one in six minority partners
(15%) were satisfied or extremely satisfied that their firms’ compensation
systems recognized the right combination of individual partner
contributions. Of course, some respondents showed confidence that their
firms took into account a wide variety of factors and seemed content
overall. Some examples:
56. Reichman & Sterling, supra note 5, at 46–47.
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• “Subjective factors play a significant role, e.g. participation in
management, civic and pro bono activities, etc. Being a team player,
cross-selling to other groups, business development efforts and being a
mentor are non-objective factors that are considered.”
• “Contribution to firm administrative, client development, trainings
and other non-billable activities is taken into consideration during the
compensation process.”

Very few respondents had true lockstep systems: Only two equity
partners reported such a system. By far, the most common system
reported by our respondents was one in which partner compensation is
based “on the partner’s own client base and total billings or collection for
that client base.” Nearly half (47%) of equity partners reported this type
of system. This percentage is dramatically higher than what management
consultants have found: They find such “eat what you kill” systems
confined to small firms, with few such systems surviving beyond the
57
founding generation of partners. The likely explanation is that
respondents felt that although firms’ systems were not formally “eat what
you kill,” in practice, they place so much value on originations, partners’
billable hours, and revenue collected that they operated much like one.
The next most common (37%) system reported by equity partners was
an objective system with various factors taken into account. Very few
equity-partner respondents (less than 1%) reported a true lockstep
58
system: This system—once widespread—has nearly been eliminated,
although at least one respondent felt strongly that women fared far
better under her firm’s lockstep system than under alternative types of
systems. However, 20% of equity-partner respondents reported that
seniority was one factor considered in setting compensation. Only 19%
reported totally subjective systems, which comes as no surprise. Small
firms are much more likely than large ones to have totally subjective
59
systems, and the respondents tended to come from larger law firms.
While some firms are explicit about the weighting of factors that
play a role in partner compensation, many are not. Many provide only a
long list of factors without much information about how the different
factors are weighted. Feelings were mixed about how different factors
are weighted in the setting of law firm compensation. Some of the
comments received were upbeat with respect to the factors taken into
account by their compensation systems:
• “Our focus is to take a qualitative look at a partner’s contribution and
fairly compensate everyone.”

57. Personal Communication with Blane Prescott, Hildebrandt Baker Robbins International Inc.,
(Dec. 3, 2008) (on file with Author).
58. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
59. Personal Communication with Blane Prescott, supra note 57.
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• “My firm does stress teamwork and the value of putting the interests
of the firm ahead of individual interests.”
• “Excellence, collegiality.”
• “Willingness to undertake firm projects; ability to work effectively in a
team-based environment.”
• “Quality of work, efficiency.”
• “Overall reputation for excellence of the partner.”
• “The firm considers a combination of business generation, fees
received on time, and matter management as objective statistics and
then look to the subjective factors such as team work, service to the
firm, cross selling etc.”
• “External profile and visibility.”

Ironically, only a few comments explicitly mentioned excellent legal
work as a factor that affects compensation. A rare example identified a
“[m]ix of objective/subjective” factors, with the “[s]ubjective based on
legal skills, teamwork, and client relationships.”
1. Transparency
A surprising number of respondents did not know what factors drive
compensation at their firms. Said one respondent, frankly, “I have no
idea what the factors are.” Others knew what factors count, but not how
those factors are weighted: “The method, we are told, considers objective
factors like client billings and billable hours. However, there are other
factors, such as mentoring, collaboration etc. that are considered. There
is no way to know how these factors are weighed or even quantified.”
Many respondents felt that their firm’s compensation systems lacked
transparency. Only slightly more than one-third (37%) of equity
partners, one-fifth (22%) of income partners, and one-fifth (23%) of
minority partners reported that the criteria the firms use to determine
partnership levels are clear or extremely clear. Slightly higher
proportions of majority respondents found the criteria clear or extremely
clear: 39% of equity partners and 25% of income partners. When
information about organizational systems is not transparent, in-group
favoritism can have a profound effect on who gets access to the necessary
information through their informal networks.
• “I have no idea how partner compensation is determined. You should
have a ‘no clue’ option in this survey.”
• “Completing this survey is difficult because the process is not completely
transparent or understood, although efforts are being made to
improve[] in this respect.”

Surprising numbers of respondents reported that they were not clear
about how their firms’ compensation system works. Only 60% of equity
partners, 30% of income partners, and 34% of minority partners
reported that they were clear or extremely clear about this crucial
information. Sixty-four percent of majority equity partners and 33% of
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majority income partners were clear or extremely clear on this. The
finding that law firm compensation systems lack transparency confirms
the findings of the Reichman and Sterling study, which quotes an income
partner:
There is this mysterious, quote, formula for setting your compensation,
but no matter how hard you work in any given year you never share in
the upside of that year. You may be rewarded in the next year, and you
may not. You share in all the downsides. . . . So you’re taking it in the
60
shorts at both ends.

Lack of information affects some equity partners as well. One survey
respondent, in a firm with a closed compensation system, reported the
sense that women partners were not informed about the necessary
criteria for elevation in the partnership ranks. A “closed system” is a
system in which individual partners do not know how much their partners
make: This information is limited to members of the compensation
committee, or other committee that decides compensation.
One positive comment highlighted the importance of transparency—
even in a firm with a closed compensation system: “I think this is the best
managed law firm anywhere, and that’s because compensation is done in
a fair way—notwithstanding the closed system—transparent to the
individual.”
2. Gap Between Policy and Practice: What Really Counts?
Many respondents felt a disconnect between the factors their firms
said they considered and what factors actually influenced compensation.
Few people had data: One would need to do a regression analysis to
ascertain which factors actually play an important role in the setting of
61
compensation in an individual firm. “A regression analysis by a
McKinsey-trained woman senior manager showed that the most
dominant factor in setting compensation is origination credit,” noted one
respondent. Many others noted a gap between policy and practice:
• “Theoretically, subjective factors are taken into account, but in truth,
we are only compensated for the amount billed and the number of
hours we work.”
• “There is a complete disconnect between what my firm says it values
and how the compensation system is then set up. We pay all kinds of
lip-service to diversity, associate training and mentoring, recruiting,
etc., but when it comes to compensation the only thing that matters is
whether you brought in the business and billed a lot of hours.”
• “I checked not important for pro bono/community service and bar
association activities because while people are encouraged to
participate, their compensation suffers if their revenue hours slip so
that they can do these types of activities.”

60. Reichman & Sterling, supra note 5, at 44.
61. Cotterman, supra note 30, at 3–4.
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• “Where I indicated ‘not important,’ most of these items the Firm
would say it considers as important, but the compensation does not
appear to reflect that.”

Consultants also have noted a gap between policy and practice. Joel
A. Rose warns that “[t]ensions can develop when the direction of firm’s
62
compensation system is unclear or receives only lip service.” He cites
three examples: (1) when a firm encourages partners to delegate work
but “overcompensates for revenue collected from partners’” own billable
hours rather than delegation, (2) when a firm encourages joint business
development but tends not to split origination credit, and (3) when a firm
encourages partners to do important nonbillable work, such as marketing,
training, and so on, but “rewards those activities marginally in favor of
63
billable hours/revenue” collected. A key arena in which a gap yawns
between policy and practice concerns the types of factors that actually
influence compensation, as opposed to the factors that firms list as
64
relevant, but which in fact rarely have a significant impact.
65
3. “Personal Productivity”
The number of hours a partner bills personally is often referred to
as “partner productivity.” Yet, as will be discussed below, rewarding
partners for working as many hours as humanly possible is not
necessarily a good business model. A most-hours-wins system tends to
disadvantage women, because it favors law firm partners who have a
specific family form that most male law firm partners, but few women
law firms partners, have: the “two-person career.” A lawyer with a twoperson career has the advantage of a spouse who takes care of most, or
all, of the lawyer’s nonwork responsibilities, from waiting for the cable
repairman to picking up the dry cleaning to caring for children and
66
elders. Lawyers with two-person careers have an advantage over both
mothers and single women, as noted by one African-American attorney
quoted in Visible Invisibility:
The male associates all had stay-at-home wives who took care of all the
everyday things. Even if they didn’t have children, their dry cleaning
was picked up, their dinner was cooked, their house was cleaned. And
67
women have to do all that stuff on top of their work.

62. Joel A. Rose, Hallmarks of a Well-Conceived Partner Compensation System, IOMA’s Rep. on
Compensation & Benefits for L. Off., Dec. 2010, at 1, 3.
63. Id. at 3–4.
64. See infra Part II.B.1.
65. James D. Cotterman, Making Better Compensation Decisions, Rep. to Legal Mgmt., Apr.
2006, at 4, 5 (Altman Weil, Inc.) (“The performance factor that most highly correlates with lawyer
compensation is personal productivity as measured by fees collected.”).
66. Hannah Papanek, Men, Women, and Work: Reflections on the Two-Person Career, 78 Am. J.
Soc. 852, 860 (1973).
67. Janet E. Gans Epner, ABA Comm’n on Women in the Prof., Visible Invisibility: Women
of Color in Law Firms 33 (2006).

Williams_62-HLJ-597 (Do Not Delete)

620

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

4/21/2011 12:19 PM

[Vol. 62:597

Our sample reflects these nationwide trends: 69% of equity-partner
respondents (virtually all women) had a spouse or partner who worked
full time for pay. Only 10% had spouses or partners who worked only
part time, and only 15% had partners who were home full time. Prior
studies show that about half of male attorneys have wives at home full
68
time.
Taking a closer look at the women who had partners at home full
time, we found that 17% were majority equity partners, 14% were
majority non-equity partners, and 7% were minority partners. In keeping
with national trends, roughly 70% of each group of partners we surveyed
had a spouse or partner who worked full time for pay: 69% of equity
partners, 70% of income partners. However, a comparison by minoritymajority status of the partners reveals that a larger proportion of
minority partners have a spouse or partner who works full time for pay
relative to majority partners: 79% minority income partners and 83%
minority equity partners, as compared to 68% majority income partners
and 65% majority equity partners. This is consistent with prior research
that finds women attorneys to be substantially more likely to be married
to a professional spouse than male attorneys—a trend that has persisted
69
since the 1960s.
About two-thirds of majority equity- (69%) and minority-partner
respondents (66%), and a slightly lower percentage of majority income
partners (59%) had primary or shared care-giving responsibilities for
70
children under 18 during their tenure at their current firms. In
professional families with children, mothers tend to find that “the buck
stops here.” Said one mother in Pamela Stone’s influential study of
professional women, when describing her husband, “He has always said
to me, ‘You can do whatever you want to do.’ But he’s not there to pick
71
up any load.” Stone found that husbands played a role in the decisions
72
of two-thirds of the women she interviewed to leave their careers.

68. Linda Bray Chanow, The Business Case for Reduced Hours, Project for Att’y Retention,
http://www.pardc.org/Publications/business_case.shtml (last visited Feb. 2, 2011) (“Nearly half of
married [male] attorneys have stay-at-home wives.”); see also Betsy Morris, It’s Her Job Too: Lorna
Wendt’s $20 Million Divorce Case Is the Shot Heard ‘Round the Water Cooler, Fortune, Feb. 2, 1998,
at 64, 65, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1998/02/02/237198/
index.htm (“[I]n 84% of the marriages in this country both spouses now have jobs. Yet the topmost
rungs of the corporate and professional American are still heavily populated by ‘traditional’
couples.”).
69. Kenneth Glenn Dau-Schmidt et al., Gender and the Legal Profession: The Michigan Alumni
Data Set 1967–2000, at 74 (2008) (unpublished paper) (on file with Indiana University School of
Law—Bloomington), available at http://works.bepress.com/kenneth_dau_schmidt/1.
70. Presumably, some respondents had child care responsibilities at an earlier or a later stage of
their careers, while others had no children.
71. Pamela Stone & Meg Lovejoy, Fast-Track Women and the “Choice” to Stay Home, 596 Am.
Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 62, 76 (2004).
72. Pamela Stone, Opting Out?: Why Women Really Quit Careers and Head Home 62 (2007).
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Why? Professional men feel under intense pressure to fulfill
workplace ideals—even if (according to management consultants) those
ideals place an artificially high value on working as many hours as
73
possible. Being a good provider still is seen as an integral part of being a
74
good father. Fathers with childcare responsibilities risk failing to
75
perform as an ideal worker and, consequently, being seen both as a bad
father and an inadequate man. Think of everyday language: When
mothers dream about their daughters marrying a “successful” man, most
are thinking of his paycheck, not his willingness to wear a baby carrier.
Said one upper-middle class man, “Let’s face it, most men want to build
their ego by saying, ‘I’ve made it, I’ve been successful.’ Hell, how do you
76
grade that success? You grade it by the amount of money you made.”
In short, gender pressures push men towards, and women away
from, two-person careers. Our respondents likely were affected by these
patterns, given that, in addition to child care, one in four (25%) equitypartner respondents and nearly one in six (17%) income-partner
respondents had primary or shared responsibility for elderly parents or
grandparents (including in-laws) or other elderly relatives. In keeping
with other studies, we found that a higher percentage of minority-partner
respondents—nearly one in three (32%)—had elder care responsibilities.
This is not big news: As a group, women have more responsibility
than men for family caregiving. This is why compensation systems that
confuse an attorney’s work schedule with the attorney’s productivity
disadvantage women—particularly women with children, but also women
without them.
a. Origination and Billable Hours Are King
“[T]he two most important partner compensation criteria in law
firms remain the ability to bring in new clients to the firm and to be
personally productive, as measured by fees collected as a working
lawyer,” reports James D. Cotterman, a management consultant at
77
Altman Weil. Blane Prescott, of Hildebrandt Baker Robbins Inc.,
agrees, noting that 80% of partner compensation has historically been

73. Nicholas W. Townsend, The Package Deal: Marriage, Work and Fatherhood in Men’s
Lives 125 (2002).
74. See, e.g., id. at 53 (discussing the central role that “providing” plays in men’s lives); William
Marsiglio & Joseph H. Pleck, Fatherhood and Masculinities, in Handbook of Studies on Men and
Masculinities 249, 260 (Michael S. Kimmel et al., eds., 2005) (“[W]hen men are unemployed or
underemployed, they often find it difficult to feel good about themselves as fathers because the
provider role continues to be an important feature of hegemonic images of masculinity and men’s
fathering experience.” (citation omitted)).
75. Joan C. Williams, Reshaping the Work-Family Debate: Why Men and Class Matter 80
(2010).
76. Michèle Lamont, Money, Morals, and Manners: The Culture of the French and the
American Upper-Middle Class, at xxix (1992).
77. Cotterman, supra note 30, at 1.
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based on some combination of origination and productivity. Other
79
experts also agree.
In fact, Cotterman’s regression analyses suggest that origination
typically is more important than billable hours: He reports that “one can
explain 80% to 90% of the variability in [equity] partner compensation
80
by knowing just one performance metric—origination.”
The percentage of compensation determined by origination varies
from firm to firm: “95% of comp[ensation] is based upon client base and
billings, and 5% discretionary,” reported one respondent. Comments
indicate that both origination and billable hours are important in some
firms, while in other firms, one factor or the other clearly trumps:
• “Originations and worked collections are all that matters.”
• “Billable hours, billable hours, billable hours.”
• “It’s all about originations.”

Other respondents mentioned different factors, highlighting the variation
between firms:
• “Firm really tries hard to do comprehensive evaluation of each
candidate.”
• “Ability to carry case management responsibilities start to finish, trial
abilities.”
• “What practice area do you belong to and is that an area of growth for
the Firm.”
• “Niche practice value.”
• “We don’t consider billable hours. It’s money in the door. Is there any
other calculus?”
• “Partner/associate leverage ratio (keeping at least two associates busy
full time).”

Our findings confirm that originations, by client or matter, or by
revenue collected, and hours worked are—by far—most often listed as
being among the top factors in setting compensation in the law firms of
our respondents. The following table lists the top ten factors listed as
either “important” or “very important” in ranked order.

78. Email from Blane Prescott to Joan C. Williams (Feb. 14, 2010, 9:38 AM) (on file with
Author).
79. See, e.g., Compensation Decisions Surveyed: Economic Troubles Change Game, IOMA’s Rep.
on Compensation & Benefits for L. Off., Sept. 2009, at 1, 5 [hereinafter Compensation Decisions
Surveyed] (concluding that origination and contributing “fee income to the firm’s top line” are the two
top factors in setting partner compensation).
80. Cotterman, supra note 30, at 11; see also Email from James D. Cotterman to Joan C. Williams
(Feb. 14, 2010, 10:09 AM) (on file with Author).
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Table 4: Top Ten Factors Listed as “Important” or
“Very Important” in Setting Law Firm Compensation
Majority
Equity
Partners

%

Majority
Income
Partners

%

Minority
Equity
Partners

%

Minority
Income
Partners

%

1. Revenue
collected

96%

1. Origination

93%

1. Origination

89%

1. Origination

93%

2. Origination

95%

3. Billable
hours
4. Client
matter
expansion/
cross-selling

86%

2. Revenue
collected
3. Billable
hours

91%
81%

2. Revenue
collected
3. Billable
hours

86%
83%

2. Revenue
collected
3. Committee
rating

86%
83%

87%

4. Committee
rating

81%

4. Being
billing partner

83%

4. Billable
hours

79%

5. Firm
management

81%

5. Client
matter
expansion/
cross-selling

78%

5. Committee
rating

77%

5. Being
billing partner

69%

6. Committee
rating

82%

6. Firm
management

71%

6. Firm
management

74%

6. Client
matter
expansion/
cross-selling

67%

7. Practice
group
management

67%

7. Being
billing partner

61%

66%

7. Firm
management

59%

8. Whose
work currently
binds client

66%

9. Being
billing partner

56%

10. Partnership
rating

45%

8. Practice
group
management
9. Whose
work currently
binds client
10. Meeting
threshold # of
billable hours

61%

7. Client
matter
expansion/
cross-selling
8. Whose
work currently
binds client

63%

60%

9. Partnership
rating

54%

56%

10. Practice
group
management

53%

8. Meeting
threshold # of
billable hours
9. Practice
group
management
10. Ownership
share

55%

55%

46%

b. Individual Cash Flow Metrics
Our findings confirm the opinions of law firm consultants
concerning the dominant role of partners’ billable hours and originations.
Our respondents showed a remarkable level of agreement about which
factors are “important” or “very important” in the setting of partner
compensation. The top three factors are origination, revenue collected,
and the partners’ own billable hours; origination and revenue collected,
as high-universal factors, were followed closely by billable hours. All
assess the extent to which a partner functions as an individual cash flow
generator within the firm; these will be referred to as the “individual cash
flow” factors. Origination credit is the single most common of these
factors, followed by the revenue collected by an individual partner.
These would obviously be the crucial measures if an individual partner
was in solo practice, for they measure whether the firm has clients, work,
and cash flow.
The next most common factor is another measure of client
relationship: being the billing partner. In some firms, the billing partner
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is almost always, or often, the originator; at other firms, the two functions
overlap less. Because equity partners are much more likely to be billing
partners than are income partners, being the billing partner is more likely
to be important for minority equity partners (83%) than for others (5661%), since minority equity partners are much less likely to receive a
high rating by the compensation committee or to be awarded origination
credit.
Individual cash flow factors can be designed in different ways. For
example, billable hours can be assessed through a system that rewards
those who work the highest possible number of billable hours, which is
the typical system. An alternative, reported by 12% of equity-partner
and 20% of income-partner respondents, is a system that requires
partners to meet a billable-hours threshold, but does not give partners
ever-increasing credit for working billable hours in excess of the
81
threshold. Such a system reflects an assessment that partners’ time may
be better spent balancing short-term profitability with contributions to
the long-term future of the firm, through business development or
human capital development. Among our respondents, the most-hourswins approach was close to twice as common as requiring partners to
meet an hours threshold, with equity partners the least likely (44%) to
report the threshold approach.
Origination, too, can be designed in different ways. The most
common is the “first touch” system, in which the partner who brings in
the client is paid forever on all future work billed by that client—whether
or not the “originator” did any work on the matter at hand. According to
equity-partner respondents, his system is five times as common as one in
which the originator only receives future credit if he or she is the
82
attorney whom the client actually calls to work on a new matter.
Some firms have abolished formal origination credit altogether,
although our survey shows that origination credit remains important in
many of those firms. Other firms have moved towards systems that
83
reward teams rather than individuals. Another trend is to reward not
origination, but a lawyer who currently binds the client to the law firm:
About half of majority and minority income partners, and two-thirds of
majority and minority equity partners, report that this is “important” or
“very important” in their compensation systems.

81. These are the percentages of respondents who listed the billable-hours threshold as “very
important” in the setting of compensation. These percentages climb to 44% and 56%, respectively, in
response to the question of what factors are either “very important” or “important.”
82. We do not report the statistic for income or minority partners, because nearly one-third of
these groups were unsure or did not know how origination credit worked at their firms, as were nearly
one-fourth of minority partners.
83. See discussion infra Part II.B.9.
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c. Institutional Investment Measures
Measures of long-term investments in the law firm as an ongoing
institution, from teamwork to effective development of human capital to
strategic initiatives, are much less likely to play an important role than
are individual cash flow measures. Less than 10% of law firm
compensation rewards teamwork, according to the Institute of
84
Management and Administration. In our survey, teamwork does not
show up in the top ten factors affecting compensation. Other institutional
investments are weighted little, if at all, as discussed below. The only
context in which respondents’ firms weigh institutional investments to
any significant extent concerns client matter expansion or cross-selling,
which was the fourth most common factor on equity partners’ lists, but
less common for income partners (fifth), minority-equity partners
(seventh), and minority-income partners (sixth). These data may indicate
that income partners are less likely than equity partners, and minority
partners are less likely than either group, to feel that they are able to
gain fair credit for their contributions to client work when they lack
origination credit.
d. Committee Rating
Rating by the committee in charge of compensation also was listed
by many respondents as playing an important role in compensation. For
majority-income and minority partners, rating by the compensation
committee shows up in the top five factors; many equity partners listed it,
too, although it appears to be a somewhat less common factor in
85
determining equity partner compensation. In some firms, committee
rating merely reflects objective metrics; in others, it can be partially or
totally subjective. The role, and impacts, of subjectivity in the setting of
86
law firm compensation will be discussed later in this report.
4. Which Factors Are Listed as “Very Important”?
A greater divergence emerges between the three groups of partners
when asked which factors are “very important” in setting compensation
at their law firms. The following table lists the top factors listed as “very
important” in ranked order:

84. Compensation Decisions Surveyed, supra note 79, at 5.
85. See supra Table 4.
86. See infra Part I.G.

Williams_62-HLJ-597 (Do Not Delete)

626

4/21/2011 12:19 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:597

Table 5: Top Ten Factors Listed as “Very Important” in
Setting Law Firm Compensation
Majority Equity
Partners

%

Majority Income
Partners

%

Minority
Partners

%

66%

1. Revenue
collected

64%

1. Revenue
collected

57%

63%

2. Origination

60%

2. Origination

52%

62%

3. Committee
rating

56%

3. Committee
rating

47%

37%

4. Billable hours

41%

4. Billable hours

35%

5. Firm
management

27%

5. Client matter
expansion/
cross-selling

36%

5. Firm
management

27%

6. Billable hours

26%

6. Being billing
partner

27%

6. Client matter
expansion/
cross-selling

26%

18%

7. Ownership
share

21%

7. Being billing
partner

25%

1. Origination
2. Revenue
collected
3. Committee
rating
4. Client matter
expansion/
cross-selling

7. Whose work
currently binds
client
8. Being billing
partner

18%

9. Rating by
other partners

12%

10. Partnership
rating

11%

8. Firm
management
9. Meeting
threshold # of
billable hours
10. Whose work
currently binds
client

19%
18%

17%

8. Ownership
share
9. Whose work
currently binds
client
10. Meeting
threshold # of
billable hours

24%
18%

17%

This chart highlights the tremendous power of compensation
committees at many, although not all, firms. Their ratings emerge high
on the list for all partners and appear to play a particularly large role in
the compensation of our equity-partner respondents.
While equity, income, and minority partners agree that revenue
collected and origination are the two most important factors, they
reverse the order of importance, with equity partners more focused on
origination, and with income and minority partners more focused on
87
revenue collected. This probably indicates no more than that partners
with books of business are more likely to be equity partners. All three
groups listed “committee rating” as the third most important factor.
Notably, majority income and minority partners both again highly rated
88
“billable hours” as a factor in setting compensation. This presumably
87. Table 5 supra.
88. Compare Table 5, supra, with Table 4, supra.
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signals that these two groups are less likely than equity partners
generally to have origination credit. To majority income and minority
partners, therefore, increasing billable hours appears to be one of the
best ways to increase their compensation. Firm management seems more
important to equity and minority partners than to income partners.
Being the billing partner seems more important to majority than
minority lawyers.
5. What Factors Are Not Important in Setting Draw or Salary?
The finding that individual cash flow categories are more important
than factors that measure long-term investments in human capital
emerges in sharp focus if we look at investment measures specifically.
Effective development of the firm’s human capital and associate
development rarely plays a role in partner compensation. Nor do
teamwork, contributions to diversity, or community service. Even
effective leveraging of associates, which is important for short-term
profitability, does not play a significant role in respondents’ firms. The
group most likely to be tapped to help with diversity efforts, minority
partners, is the least likely to feel that the contributions to diversity
efforts are rewarded.
Table 6: Factors Rarely Listed as “Very Important” in
89
Law Firm Compensation
Minority
Partners

Majority Equity
Partners

%

Majority Income
Partners

%

14. Effective
development of
firm’s human
capital

7%

14. Contributions
to diversity efforts

4%
(tie)

13. Teamwork

7%
(tie)

14. Teamwork

4%
(tie)

13. Effective
development of
firm’s human
capital

7%
(tie)

2%
(tie)

16. Effective
leveraging of
associates

5%

2%
(tie)

19. Pro bono
and community
service

2%
(tie)

1%

19. Contributions
to diversity

2%
(tie)

15. Effective
leveraging of
associates

5%

16. Contributions
to diversity

3%

18. Associate
development
work
18. Pro bono and
community
service

2%
(tie)
2%
(tie)

16. Effective
development of
firm’s human
capital
16. Effective
leveraging of
associates
18. Associate
development

%

89. Note that the overall ranking out of twenty-two possible factors is included in the table.
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These factors are more often listed as “important” but not “very
important,” as shown in Table 7 below. Equity partners are much more
likely than income partners to believe that effective leveraging of
associates and firm committee work (other than on diversity committees)
play an important role in compensation at their law firms; minority
lawyers again were in the middle, reflecting that group’s composition of a
combination of income and equity partners. Fewer than one-in-three of
each group of partners believed that associate development, firm
committee work, or diversity contributions were “important” or “very
important.”
Table 7: Factors Less Often Listed as “Important” or
90
“Very Important” in Law Firm Compensation
Majority Equity
Partners
12. Effective
leveraging of
associates
16. Other firm
committee work
17. Contributions
to diversity
efforts
18. Associate
development

%

42%
30%

Majority
Income
Partners
15. Effective
leveraging of
associates
17. Associate
development

%

28%
22%

29%

18. Other firm
committee work

21%

27%

19. Contribution
to diversity
efforts

21%

Minority
Partners
15. Effective
leverage of
associates
17. Associate
development
18. Contributions
to diversity
efforts
19. Other firm
committee work

%

32%
19%
18%

17%

Thus some of the activities crucial to the long-term health of law
firms as institutions typically play little role in partner compensation.
Today’s top lawyers will not live forever, yet their firms typically do not
reward associate development or effective development of the firm’s
human capital. Typically, firms do not reward all measures of teamwork,
including teamwork itself, ironically. More intriguing still, effective
leveraging of associates is often undervalued, while a partners’ personal
hours billed, which cuts against effective leveraging, is overvalued. And,
of course, committee work other than on the compensation or
management committee is undervalued, with work on diversity often
91
valued even less than other non-compensation committee work.
All this negatively impacts the compensation of women as a group.
Women are more likely to serve on diversity or associates’ committees
90. Note that the overall ranking out of twenty-two possible factors is included in the table.
91. An interesting wrinkle is that studies show that serving on the firm’s recruitment committee
does have a positive effective on compensation. See Dinovitzer, Reichman & Sterling, supra note 3, at
835.
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than on compensation, business development, or partnership selection
92
committees. The Reichman and Sterling study of Colorado lawyers
described a female department head in a medium-sized firm, Paula
Kramer, thusly:
She was the “go to” person for cases in a new practice area that she
developed. She also was the head of the recruitment committee and
the associates’ committee. All were essential to the smooth operation
of the firm, but she was rarely given credit for the work she did on
them. She told us that at “every compensation meeting I have . . . been
93
really miserable.”

When she complained, her firm was shocked and raised her
94
compensation, “but [it was] still not as high as the partner above her.”
Appointment of women to these less-powerful committees is driven, in
part, “by the desire of firms, for good reasons, to have diversity in their
committee rosters,” notes James J. Sandman, former Managing Partner
of Arnold & Porter LLP and current General Counsel for the District of
95
Columbia Public Schools. “Usually the most important committees are
elected, often by a weighted vote, with the votes of partners having more
96
shares carrying more weight.” The results speak for themselves: Women
are underrepresented on elected compensation and executive
committees. Sandman concluded, “Firms end up doing what they can—
through appointments to other committees—where they can to create
97
committee opportunities for women.”
The issue is not malevolent intent, but results. Once women are
asked to serve on the less powerful committees, it may be hard to say no.
Said Kathryn Fritz, Managing Partner of Fenwick & West LLP:
I do think generally, with respect to all administrative duties, it is much
easier for men to say no and take no penalty for it because the
assumption is they must be spending their time doing something else
for the firm. A woman, on the other hand, both may feel more internal
pressure to say yes (the “good girl” problem) and every “no” may raise
a question about her commitment to the institution. I think this is just a
different flavor of the potential/achievement dichotomy applied to a
different set of tasks (he has a better potential way to spend his
98
time/she needs to do what we ask her to do or she isn’t achieving).

92. Judith S. Kaye & Anne C. Reddy, Essay, The Progress of Women Lawyers at Big Firms:
Steadied or Simply Studied?, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 1941, 1947 (2008) (citing a 2001 New York State Bar
Association study).
93. Reichman & Sterling, supra note 5, at 67.
94. Id. at 68.
95. Telephone Interview with James J. Sandman, Gen. Counsel, D.C. Pub. Schs. (Apr. 12, 2010).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Telephone Interview with Kathryn Fritz, Managing Partner, Fenwick & West LLP (Feb. 26,
2010).
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Sandman adds,
When a man turns down a committee assignment saying, “I would like
to concentrate on building my practice,” people tend to nod and say
“that’s a smart decision.” That may happen less often if it’s a woman.
Women are more likely to say “I’ve got a lot on my plate,” or to feel
99
guilty and express their guilt.

This may be because women feel less entitled than men, or may be
because they expect pushback if they simply refuse to serve in a direct
way.
In addition, social science documents that, in male-dominated
environments, women often face pressures to play traditionally feminine
roles. “I’m like the frigging firm mom,” said one woman, who clearly felt
100
trapped by the role, “People come to me if they’re having problems.”
Social psychologists identify other traditionally feminine roles that may
arise in workplace settings: the “princess,” who aligns with but does not
threaten the dominance of a powerful man; the “cheerleader” who
applauds male achievements; “Ms. Efficiency,” who cheerfully accepts
the ministerial tasks; the “daughter” who looks up to the men around
101
her. This pattern may also help explain why women end up playing
traditionally feminine roles such as attending to the development of the
young (associate development; running the summer program) and
engaging in community building (pro bono committee).
In short, women may well find themselves facing pressure, at times
gentle and well-meaning, to contribute to law firms in ways that are
important to the long-term health of the firm, but whose value is not
rewarded when compensation levels are set.
6. What Factors Are Important in Setting Bonuses?
In roughly three-fourths of respondents’ firms, the same evaluation
mechanisms and processes applied in the case of cash bonuses. Among
respondents whose firms used a different system for bonuses, a mix of
objective and subjective factors is used in roughly two-thirds of incomepartner respondents’ firms and half the firms of minority- and equitypartner respondents. About one in four equity and minority partners, but

99. Telephone Interview with James J. Sandman, supra note 95.
100. Holly English, Gender on Trial: Sexual Stereotypes and Work/Life Balance in the
Legal Workplace 119 (2003).
101. See, e.g., Kay Deaux et al., Level of Categorization and Content of Gender Stereotypes, 3 Soc.
Cognition 145, 166 (1985); Peter Glick & Susan T. Fiske, An Ambivalent Alliance: Hostile and
Benevolent Sexism as Complementary Justifications for Gender Inequality, 56 Am. Psychol. 109, 113
(2001); Shelley E. Taylor, A Categorization Approach to Stereotyping, in Cognitive Processes in
Stereotyping and Intergroup Behavior 83, 84 (David L. Hamilton ed., 1981); see also Joan C.
Williams, The Social Psychology of Stereotyping: Using Social Science to Litigate Gender
Discrimination Cases and Defang the “Cluelessness” Defense, 7 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. 401, 419–20
(2003).
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only 6% of income partners, reported that bonuses are awarded solely on
subjective assessments. This probably reflects the fact that income
partners’ bonuses tend to be very formula-driven and therefore,
objective. About one-third of all respondents said that bonuses are
rewarded solely on objective criteria.
Wide variation exists with respect to bonuses. Comments indicate
that firms use bonuses in a wide variety of contexts. Some examples are
bonuses given to partners who had a particularly good year, to
“overwhelming work on a firm (nonbillable) project,” to “friends of
managing partners . . . and those on committee deciding compensation
and bonuses,” to “extraordinary efforts or results in a given year by
young partners,” to originators of new clients or new matters, to “the
most highly compensated partners,” and finally, “It is a mystery to
me . . . .” Another response indicated, “the threat of leaving [by] big
originators appears to be very influential.” And another: “Our bonusing
is very subjective and is simply ‘fairness’ based.” One respondent noted
that bonuses depended on the overall profitability of the firm. Some
firms give bonuses chiefly to income partners, while at other firms, they
appear to go chiefly to equity partners.
When bonuses were given, the top factors influencing prospective
law firm compensation were very similar to the top factors used to set
retrospective bonuses. Factors below the top four are considerably less
common in the calculation of bonuses than they are in influencing
prospective compensation. With the exception of majority income
partners’ 44% agreement that committee ratings are “very important” in
setting bonuses, the fifth-highest ranking item reached less than a 30%
consensus among partners.
Table 8: Top Factors Listed as “Very Important” in Setting Bonuses
Majority
Equity
Partners

%

Majority
Income
Partners

%

1. Revenue
collected

63%

1. Revenue
collected

62%

2. Origination

58%

2. Origination

56%

3. Committee
rating
4. Billable
hours
5. Client
matter
expansion/
cross-selling

56%

42%

29%

3. Client
matter
expansion/
cross-selling
4. Billable
hours
5. Committee
rating

Minority
Equity
Partners
1. Committee
rating
2. Revenue
collected

%

Minority
Income
Partners

%

50%

1. Revenue
Collected

64%

42%

2. Origination

61%

30%

3. Billable
hours

38%

3. Billable
hours

59%

46%

4. Origination

34%

4. Committee
rating

56%

44%

Numbers too
small to report

—

Numbers too
small to report

—

We also analyzed what were the factors listed as either “important” or
“very important” in the setting of bonuses.
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Table 9: Factors Listed as “Important” or
“Very Important” in Setting Bonuses
Majority
Equity
Partners

%

1. Origination

81%

1. Revenue
collected

87%

1. Revenue
collected

77%

1. Revenue
collected

79%

81%

2. Origination

86%

2. Origination

75%

2. Origination

79%

2. Revenue
collected
3. Committee
rating
4. Billable
hours
5. Client
matter
expansion/
cross-selling

75%
71%

69%

Majority
Income
Partners

3. Billable
hours
4. Committee
rating
5. Client
matter
expansion/
cross-selling

%

77%
69%

70%

6. Firm
management

58%

6. Being billing
partner

56%

7. Whose work
currently binds
client?

53%

7. Firm
management

50%

8. Being billing
partner

41%

8. Whose work
currently binds
client?

47%

Minority
Equity
Partners

3. Committee
rating
4. Billable
hours
5. Being billing
partner
6. Client
matter
expansion/
cross-selling
7. Whose work
currently binds
client?
8. Firm
management

%

72%
69%

69%

Minority
Income
Partners

3. Committee
rating
4. Billable
hours
5. Client
matter
expansion/
cross-selling

%

78%
70%

57%

59%

6. Being billing
partner

54%

57%

7. Firm
management

47%

52%

8. Practice
group rating

44%

Once again, with the exception of cross-selling and committee
ratings (themselves often based on individual cash flow metrics),
individual cash flow metrics appear to predominate in the setting of
bonuses. Consultant commentary confirms that bonus pools, which are
becoming more common, typically are used to reward an equity partner
102
who “had an unusually good year.”
7. Do the Factors That Are Important in Setting Compensation
Differ from the Factors Important in Determining Elevation to
Equity Partnership?
Our survey also asked what factors play important roles in the
decision whether to elevate lawyers from income to equity partner. Once
again, revenue collected, billable hours, origination, and committee
rating were the top four factors listed by all groups of respondents. Yet
some striking differences emerged between the factors considered for
elevation to equity partnership and the factors that influence partner
compensation. Equity-partners’ responses suggest that teamwork (61%),
effective leveraging of associates (43%), committee work (37%), effective
development of the firm’s human capital (43%), associate development
(36%), and contributions to diversity effects (32%) are considerably
more likely to be considered “important” or “very important” for criteria
for elevation to equity partnership than they are as criteria for partner
102. Cotterman, supra note 30, at 1 (stating that bonuses are becoming more common).
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compensation. These factors may well play an important role in elevation
to partnership than in partner compensation, because lawyers who are
just being elevated to partnership status often do not yet have significant
originations—which means that other factors inevitably play a larger
role.
D. The Allocation of, and Disputes over, Origination Credit
Just today, a capital partner indicated to me in an email, which he
copied to the client, that I should not have opened a new matter
(regardless that he was getting credit for the new matter). . . . [T]his is a
client that the capital partner inherited from another attorney who left
the firm . . . . [F]rom what I can tell, I’ve worked with the client longer
than he has.

According to Rose, in many firms, origination credit ranges between
20% and 25% of billings, with credit in some firms ranging as high as
103
33%. This is particularly dramatic because, in many firms that award
formal origination credit, such credit never “sunsets” but instead lasts
forever: “Relationship credit survives until the partner has absolutely no
involvement with the client any longer,” said one respondent. Of the
equity-partner respondents who reported that their firms had origination
credit, over half (56%) reported permanent credit for all work on a given
client account. Another 11% of equity-partner respondents reported a
different system: Partners received origination credit only for new work
if the client placed the phone call to the original originating attorney
when a new matter came in. Fully 11% did not know how origination
credit worked at their firms, which, given the complexity of some firms’
systems and the ambiguities in the way origination credit is defined,
probably is not surprising. In several comments, some respondents
reported “sunsets”: that origination credit at their firm was limited to
three years. Other firms had a functional, although not a formal, sunset:
“Almost always some credit for future, frequent splitting with others; if
originator becomes detached from client/work, this credit is given little
or no weight.”
Forty percent of equity-partner respondents worked in firms that
formally award origination credit, yet this far underestimates the
importance, and the prevalence, of origination credit. As noted above,
origination is one of the top factors considered in setting compensation
at most firms—even in firms that do not formally award origination
104
credit. Of the 40% of firms that award formal origination credit, 88%
reported systems that allow partners to split origination credit. This may

103. Rose, supra note 62, at 5.
104. See supra Tables 4 & 5. This is slightly lower than the percentage of firms in general:
Cotterman reported in 2008 that 56% of law firms surveyed by Altman Weil, Inc. awarded formal
origination credit. See Cotterman, supra note 30, at 1.
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be more aspirational than commonplace: The 2009 Altman Weil survey
reported that, in fact, “Strikingly few clients are ‘shared’ for origination
105
purposes . . . .” Four out of five (80%) equity-partner respondents felt
they had been denied their fair share of origination credit at some point
over the past three years. Thirteen percent said this happened often,
38% said it happened occasionally, and 30% said it had happened rarely.
Income-partner respondents were more likely than equity partners
to work in firms that awarded origination credit (50%). They were as
likely as equity partners (88%) to report systems that allow partners to
split origination credit. Income partners were a bit more likely than equity
partners (83% versus 80%) to report having been denied their fair share
of origination credit over the past three years, were more likely to
believe that this happened to them often (18% versus 13%), and were
less likely to believe it happened rarely (16% versus 30%).
Minority partners were less likely than other respondents to work in
firms that award origination credit (39%) and less likely to report
systems that allow partners to split origination credit (76%). Minority
partners were about as likely as other respondents to have been denied
their fair share of origination credit: Approximately 20% of majority
income and minority partners and 16% of majority equity partners
report having “never” been denied credit.
Table 10: Origination Credit

Work in firms that
award origination
credit
Split origination
credit
Denied fair share of
credit in last three
years
Often
Occasionally
Rarely

Majority
Equity
Partners

Majority
Income
Partners

Minority
Income
Partners

Minority
Equity
Partners

Minority
Partners

40%

51%

46%

34%

39%

91%

88%

85%

—

76%

84%

82%

—

—

86%

14%
37%
33%

16%
22%
22%

—
—
—

—
—
—

19%
19%
47%

Minority-partner respondents were more likely than majority
attorneys to face disputes about origination credit. Forty-eight percent
faced them often or occasionally, compared with only about one-third
(30%) of equity partners and income partners (32%). Minority-partner
respondents also were less likely to report that such disputes occurred
rarely (44% equity; 46% income; 32% minority) or never (27% equity;

105. Id. at 9.
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22% income; 16% minority). This is an area with the strongest racial
differences we identified.
Table 11: Strong Racial Differences in Disputes over
Origination Credit

Disputes over
origination credit
Often
Occasionally
Rarely
Never

Majority
Equity
Partners

Majority
Income
Partners

73%

78%

84%

8%
22%
43%
27%

3%
29%
46%
22%

12%
40%
32%
16%

Minority
Partners

Approximately one-fourth (27%) of majority equity-partner
respondents reported feeling that a partner had tried to intimidate,
threaten, or bully them into backing down in a dispute over origination
credit, compared to 32% among majority income partners and 36% of
minority partners. A few respondents felt that they had been bullied, but
no more than men were: “But no more than that person would have
bullied a male.” Some answers are vague (“I don’t feel comfortable
providing this detail”), while many are vivid:
• “I have had experiences where men tried to undermine my
involvement, take credit for my work, claim credit for relationships
when the client literally did not know who they were, and in the past, I
have literally been told I was stupid to think the client was basing its
decision to use my services on me.”
• “My practice group leader demanded a large percentage of origination
credit for a client where I had the relationship. Since he was my
practice group leader, I felt intimidated to agree.”
• “Senior equity partner with no real relationship to client made it
difficult for me to claim origination for client where origination is
obvious. Had to split origination with him 50/50 although he has not
had relationship with or billed anything to client in over 3 years.”
• “Senior white partner starts to have lunch with and meet with my
clients—not telling me about it and excluding me from the client
relationship. He then claims that he brought in the additional new
work from my client, and that he is sharing one-half credit.”
• “Once I was told that I shouldn’t take a matter, that I should give it to
someone else because it wasn’t my direct area of litigation, which
others never had to do in similar situations; once I was lead counsel on
trial team but had no supervisory origination credit because partner
who brought the matter in needed the credit that year.”

Some respondents reported being told they would be cut out of future
relationships unless they shared or ceded origination credit. Some
examples:
• “Threats to pull all future work and opportunities.”
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• “Suggestion that would not refer any work in the future . . . .”
• “Implicit threat that if they had to share credit on this matter, they
wouldn’t come to you with another.”
• “I can make your life difficult.” “On the other hand, I can be helpful.”
• “I was actually told that I was ‘trying to steal clients’ and that it would
make more sense to send all the work to associates. I struggled for a
year trying to build up my own practice separate from managing
partner who made the threat (and stood by it).”

In yet another context, the power of firm leaders and power players
emerges in clear focus.
• “The other partner called the conflict screening people and told them
to change the billing credit. I elected not to fight, as . . . he was on our
firm’s management committee that made compensation decisions.”
• “My own department chair opened a matter for one of my clients, but
told me that ‘this one was his,’ and refused to give me any credit.”
• “[Origination credit went] . . . to the practice group leader who was a
good friend of the partner.”
• “Origination from ‘institutional clients’ is not divided fairly. Cold calls
that come into the firm are directed to the head of department or
members of the board. Given that firm management (e.g. head of
litigation department) does not change very often (once every ten to
twelve years), this type of origination tends to cluster with the senior
men.”
• “[Originations are] not necessarily connected to your being the reason
the client sent the work to the firm. Rather they arise from being the
first contact and having the internal political clout to demand that you
are to get all or most of the origination. If you are the one who
expands a client relationship there is no reason to believe that you will
get any origination credit for your effort.”
• “[O]r they just lie to your face and agree to do something and simply
never follow up equitably as promised. These same people make the
decision on my future and pay.”

Other researchers have made similar findings. Said a partner in a
national firm, “Position and power determine whether [origination
106
credit] is split or kept.”
A few comments highlight the costs to clients of law firms’ decision
to treat partners as individual profit centers:
• “Tax lawyer refused to work further on a multi-jurisdictional
transaction if I did not let him be an originator and billing
partner . . . at a point . . . when the deal needed him. I went to
Managing Partner and won the ‘appeal’ but nothing happened to the
tax lawyer.”

106. Nancy J. Reichman & Joyce S. Sterling, Recasting the Brass Ring: Deconstructing and
Reconstructing Workplace Opportunities for Women Lawyers, 29 Cap. U. L. Rev. 923, 947 (2002).
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• “I brought in work outside of my area and other partner refused to do
work unless granted billing credit. I refused. Work was ultimately
turned down resulting in my loss of client.”
• “I went to our group Managing Partner to discuss the matter and he
summarily dismissed my concerns and stated that partners often get
work from different contacts at a client (not generally true unless by
agreement of the partners) and that my client contact (a woman
known to him) was just trying to rile things up.”

Two recognizable patterns of gender bias emerge in the comments
on disputes over origination credit. The first is that women have to “try
twice as hard to get half as far” because of an unspoken sense that men
are entitled to share credit (but women are not). As one respondent
described,
“This issue has been the most challenging for me. Some of the young
male partners are just handed shared origination because ‘their brains
also brought in the client.’ I have not had the same level of shared
financial opportunity, despite more years of helping to build the very
clients whom I requested to share . . . .”

The second stems from a pattern known as the “double bind.”
Studies show that women are often faulted for lacking in collegiality or
for having personality problems for behavior that, in a man, is seen as
showing “he is someone to be reckoned with,” or that “he knows his own
107
worth.” Women who behave confidently and assertively are not as well
108
received as men who do so. Women managers who adopt a direct,
109
assertive style tend to trigger strongly negative evaluations. Women
110
who act assertively tend to be less popular than men who do so. The
risks for women are particularly pronounced when macho behavior is

107. Double Bind, Gend. Bias Learning Project, Ctr. for WorkLife Law,
http://genderbiasbingo.com/stereotype_doublebind.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2011).
108. See, e.g., Doré Butler & Florence L. Geis, Nonverbal Affect Responses to Male and Female
Leaders: Implications for Leadership Evaluations, 58 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 48, 54 (1990)
(finding that “intellectual assertiveness by women in mixed-sex discussions elicits visible cues of
negative affect” and that women leaders received fewer “pleased” responses and more “displeased”
responses from group members, while male leaders experienced the opposite); Norma Costrich et al.,
When Stereotypes Hurt: Three Studies of Penalties for Sex-Role Reversals, 11 J. Experimental Soc.
Psychol. 520, 520 (1975) (finding that women who engaged in sex-role reversals by behaving in line
with stereotypes counter to their sex—namely, as aggressive-assertive—suffered adverse effects in
their popularity ratings and in their perceived psychological adjustments); Madeline E. Heilman et al.,
Has Anything Changed? Current Characterizations of Men, Women, and Managers, 74 J. Applied
Psychol. 935, 939 (1989) (“[O]ur analyses also indicated a set of items that . . . emerged to
differentiate women managers from both men managers and successful managers. Included in this
cluster of items are the following: bitter, hasty, quarrelsome, selfish, less understanding, independent,
high need for power, and high need for achievement.”).
109. See, e.g., Alice H. Eagly et al., Gender and the Evaluation of Leaders: A Meta-Analysis,
111 Psychol. Bull. 3, 3, 5–6, 12, 16 (1992) (“[W]omen in leadership positions [a]re devalued relative
to their male counterparts when leadership [i]s carried out in stereotypically masculine styles,
particularly when this style [i]s autocratic or directive.”).
110. See Costrich et al., supra note 108, at 520–30.
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rewarded (“Rainmakers and aggressiveness are important factors,”
noted one respondent), given that aggressiveness is often admired in men
111
but faulted in women. Disputes over origination credit can jeopardize
the reputations of women partners unless they have an unusual degree of
political skill and savvy—more than is required of their male partners.
This gender dynamic is exacerbated if women have to struggle to
gain origination credit that would have been offered automatically to a
man. When women have to fight more battles, not only are they likely to
win fewer; they may well also pay a long-term price in terms of perceived
likability. This exacerbates the situation because women who are not
likeable often are judged more harshly than men who behave in similar
ways. The double bind stems from a pattern called “ambivalent sexism,”
in which women who show traditionally feminine behaviors are met with
benevolent approval but not necessarily taken seriously, while women
112
who do not are respected, but met with hostile disapproval. Of course,
to succeed in most organizations requires being both liked and respected.
One respondent provided the most concise description of the double
bind offered: “I know that I will be punished [for] raising my concerns,
and yet know that I’ll be mistreated if I don’t.”
Another respondent voiced her fear of getting “a reputation as a
difficult woman.” A third “got the impression the older male partner
thought I was being ‘uppity.’” A fourth reported, “[T]hey make your
position seem selfish . . . .” Allegations that women are behaving selfishly
often stem from the unspoken insistence that women conform to
feminine role expectations that women are selfless and communal,
concerned more with the welfare of others than with their own
113
interests. Said one respondent, “It is an old boys’ network and if you
complain you are accused of not being a team player.” The speaker
clearly has the impression that a man would not have encountered the
same problem.

111. Id.; see also Eagly et al., supra note 109, at 16 (finding that women, but not men, “are
negatively evaluated when they exhibit masculine leadership styles”).
112. See, e.g., Susan T. Fiske et al., (Dis)respecting Versus (Dis)liking: Status and Interdependence
Predict Ambivalent Stereotypes of Competence and Warmth, 55 J. Soc. Issues 473, 476 (1999); Peter
Glick & Susan T. Fiske, Ambivalent Sexism, in 33 Advances in Experimental Social Psychology
115, 151 (2001).
113. See Joan Williams, UnBending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and What to
Do About It 14–36, 251 (2000); see also Alice H. Eagly & Linda L. Carli, Through the Labyrinth:
The Truth About How Women Become Leaders 78–81, 86–87 (2007) (positing that women who are
too supportive or “communal” may be seen as weak, while women who are too assertive may not be
liked by others); Eagly et al., supra note 109, at 11–12 (finding that women leaders were viewed more
negatively when they adopted an autocratic, masculine leadership style, as compared with a
democratic, feminine style).

Williams_62-HLJ-597 (Do Not Delete)

February 2011]

4/21/2011 12:19 PM

NEW MILLENNIUM, SAME GLASS CEILING?

639

Other respondents report harsh consequences for women who do
not gracefully back down from their claims for origination credit or
increased compensation:
• “Meeting held with me and four male partners at which my
contribution was totally trashed, until I agreed to waive any claim to
credit and then my practice group leader took a cut himself apparently
for facilitating. It was just me arguing against the two guys claiming
the credit should be totally theirs although it had been my client for
years. The other two guys said nothing.”
• “Last year when I did make a stink after a phenomenal year,
management purported to reward me for my great performance . . . but
simultaneously hosed my husband, who is also partner, by exactly the
same amount to the penny and denied (they were affronted by my
drawing) any relationship.”

These situations are particularly intriguing. Assuming the informants’
assessments were correct, one possible explanation may be found in
studies that document that violating stereotypes can result in social and
114
economic reprisals—a phenomenon known as the “backlash effect.” In
a series of experiments, men and women competed in a computer game
115
about football. When women beat men at this male-domain task,
women tended to be sabotaged—male subjects were more likely to
provide them with misleading clues in preparation for the next task to be
116
undertaken. Subjects who sabotaged the gender deviants showed
117
greater subsequent self-esteem.
When faced with the double bind, one strategy is to fight. The other
strategy, less risky and probably more common, is to give way in order to
118
conform to expectations. As respondents described:
• “It is subtle. You just know not to make an issue of it.”
• “I would never be confrontational about this.”
• “I would never enter into such a dispute . . . for that would have
extremely negative consequences with management far in excess of
any benefit associated with the billing credit.”
• “I just back down. I depend on others to share the origination with me
so it is not worth it to me to get a reputation as one who disputes
origination allocation.”
• “I make it a practice not to dispute business generation credit with my
partners. I am a firm believer that ‘what goes around comes around.’ I

114. See Laurie A. Rudman, Self-Promotion as a Risk Factor for Women: The Costs and Benefits of
Counterstereotypical Impression Management, 74 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 629, 629 (1998)
(“[W]omen may suffer from a backlash effect in which self-promotion may enhance perceptions of
their qualifications, but at the cost of social rejection.”).
115. Laurie A. Rudman & Kimberly Fairchild, Reactions to Counterstereotypic Behavior: The Role
of Backlash in Cultural Stereotype Maintenance, 87 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 157, 162 (2004).
116. Id. at 162, 164.
117. Id. at 164.
118. See id. at 169–70, 172.
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find, however, that my male partners are much more aggressive about
‘grabbing’ credit in circumstances that might be questioned by an
objective observer.”

Survey comments alone cannot answer the relevant question: Are these
respondents giving way because life is too short to fight with one’s
partners, or because they recognize that they will pay a price if they are
seen as “difficult” for doing what, in a man, would be seen as legitimately
trying to protect one’s own interests?
Research suggests that the double bind often plays a role in
compensation decisions. One survey respondent referred researchers to a
news article reporting on a study that women who attempt to negotiate
often face negative consequences: “Anyone studying how women do, or
119
do not, get ahead in the workplace should go read this article.” The
relevant study, co-authored by Linda Babcock (who wrote Women Don’t
Ask: Negotiation and the Gender Divide, which sends quite a different
120
examined whether and how women negotiate for
message)
121
The first experiment, which investigated whether
compensation.
subjects were willing to hire candidates who initiated a salary
negotiation, found both male and female evaluators were more likely to
penalize female candidates who initiated salary negotiations more than
122
men who did so. The second experiment, which explored people’s
willingness to work with women who negotiated salary, found that
women, but not men, incurred a large penalty for attempting
negotiations—the penalty for women was 5.5 times steeper than the
penalty for men—and both women and men were less willing to work
123
The third
with other women who initiated salary negotiations.
experiment, which involved a video of the candidate’s interview, found
that male evaluators—but not females—penalized women for salary
negotiations, and they insisted on a greater degree of likeability from
124
women candidates than from men. The final experiment found that
when the evaluator was male, women were more reluctant than men to
125
negotiate compensation. This difference did not exist when the evaluator
126
was a woman.
119. Hannah Riley Bowles et al., Social Incentives for Gender Divergences in the Propensity to
Initiate Negotiations: Sometimes It Does Hurt to Ask, 103 Organizational Behav. & Hum. Decision
Processes 84 (2007).
120. See generally Linda Babcock & Sara Laschever, Women Don’t Ask: Negotiation and the
Gender Divide (2003). The basic thrust of Women Don’t Ask is that women do not get ahead, because
they do not negotiate as well as men—that “women don’t ask.” Babcock’s academic studies suggest
that many women do not ask because they encounter pushback when they do. See id. at 1–17.
121. Bowles et al., supra note 119, at 84.
122. Id. at 89.
123. Id. at 91.
124. Id. at 99.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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Babcock and her co-authors asked whether women’s greater
reluctance “to initiate negotiations over . . . compensation could be
127
explained by the differential treatment of male and female negotiators”
128
and concluded “the answer is yes.” In the first three experiments, the
authors pointed out, male evaluators punished women more than men
129
for attempting to negotiate salary. In the third, women’s reluctance to
130
negotiate salary disappeared when negotiating with a woman. “We
show with this research that women’s disinclination relative to men to
initiate negotiations over resources, such as compensation, may be traced
131
to the higher social costs that they face when doing so.” The authors
point out that their results indicate that society rewards women for living
up to the feminine ideals of modesty, niceness, warmth, and sensitivity to
others, and often penalizes women for engaging in the kind of
competitive, self-promoting behaviors that are accepted as appropriate
132
for men. “As lower-status group members making claims to the
privileges of higher-status group members, women are likely to appear
inappropriately demanding if they attempt to negotiate for higher levels
133
of compensation,” especially (but not only) if the evaluator is a man.
Other studies confirm that women’s inability to negotiate disappears
when negotiating for others; it is only when they negotiate for themselves
that they falter, for fear they will transgress the separate-spheres
134
mandate of selflessness. This conclusion is further supported by the
135
findings of a meta-analysis of sixty-two different studies.
This may help explain why few respondents to our survey were
“satisfied” or “extremely satisfied” with their ability to negotiate or
address any concerns they had regarding compensation. Only about one
in five minority (21%) and income (19%) partners, and one in three
(32%) equity partners reported satisfaction, as noted in Table 12.

127. Id. at 98–99.
128. Id. at 99.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 98–99.
133. Id. at 86.
134. Linda Babcock & Sara Laschever, Ask for It: How Women Can Use the Power of
Negotiation to Get What They Want 156 (2009).
135. Amy E. Walters et al., Gender and Negotiator Competitiveness: A Meta-Analysis,
76 Organizational Behav. & Hum. Decision Processes 1, 1 (1998).
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Table 12: How Satisfied Are You with Your Ability to Effectively
Negotiate or Address Any Concerns
You May Have Regarding Your Compensation?

Extremely satisfied
Satisfied
Neutral or mixed
opinion
Dissatisfied
Extremely dissatisfied

Majority
Equity
Partners

Majority
Income
Partners

Minority
Partners

11%
23%

2%
20%

5%
13%

22%

32%

27%

25%
19%

20%
26%

40%
16%

Both partnership status and race significantly affected whether our
respondents felt comfortable raising questions or concerns about their
compensation with law firm management or their firm’s compensation
committee. Over half of majority equity-partner respondents (53%) felt
“comfortable” or “extremely comfortable,” but only about one-third
(34%) of majority income partners and minority partners did. Nearly one
in three equity partners (32% majority; 36% minority) felt
“uncomfortable” or “extremely uncomfortable” raising such issues, as
compared to 45% of majority income partners. Minority income partners
reported the highest level of discomfort (61%). Discomfort about raising
questions and concerns may stem from personal hesitations, or it may
reflect fears of pushback that are exacerbated not only by gender, but also
by race.
On the bright side, some respondents reported that they had not run
into trouble over matters of origination, or that their firms dealt effectively
with partners who are unfair in the allocation of origination credit. Some
examples:
• “The compensation committee knows which partners have a habit of
not distributing credit fairly and makes behind-the-scenes adjustments.”
• “Credit is negotiated between partners, and partners who have a
reputation for ‘fairness’ in credit sharing and collaboration, arguably
have a competitive advantage in the long haul.”
• “In our firm, we have a policy that each partner will help others on
their pitches for no compensation or share of the client if the client
comes on board . . . .”
• “[In our lockstep system, where] the ideal is that we are a team and it
takes everyone to make the firm profitable for us all, I don’t want to
let my partners down and I work harder. I don’t think it is just women
either. I believe research shows that there are many motivators to
human behavior other than money.”

Other respondents felt well equipped to deal with any problems that
arose:
• “I generate almost all of my own work ($2.5 million+ book), so I am
rarely in a position where I have to ask for credit. When I do pitch
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work with other partners, I ask for an agreement before the pitch that
we will split any credit for the new work equally. If a partner won’t
agree to this arrangement then I don’t do a pitch with them.”
• “If there is resistance I don’t push the issue. I would not want to
poison my well over this sort of thing. It does however influence my
actions going forward.”

Disputes over origination credit are handled typically either through
negotiations between the affected partners or through review by a
compensation or other internal committee. Equity-partner respondents
were more likely (67%) than income-partner respondents (56%) to
report disputes handled by negotiation. Income partners were much less
likely to report that disputes over origination credit were handled by the
compensation or other internal management committee (28%, as
compared with 48% of equity partners).
Income-partner respondents (21%) and both groups of minoritypartner respondents (25%) were much less likely than equity partners
(45%) to report being “satisfied” or “extremely satisfied” with the way
such disputes are generally resolved. Majority and minority income
partners were considerably more likely to be “dissatisfied”: 31% of
income and 42% of minority income partners were “dissatisfied,” as
opposed to 17% of minority and majority equity partners.
In short, disputes over origination credit are a significant factor in
the lives of many women lawyers. Among the 50% of respondents whose
firms awarded origination credit, four out of five equity partners, and
even more income and minority partners, reported having been denied a
fair share of origination credit in the past three years. Minority-partner
respondents were even more likely than majority women to find
themselves in disputes over origination credit. Most disturbing, a quarter
of the equity-partner respondents, a third of the income-partner and the
minority-equity respondents, and 40% of the minority-income respondents
reported feeling that a partner had tried to intimidate, threaten, or bully
them into backing down in a dispute over origination credit.
E. Is the Real Problem That Women Have Less Time for
Rainmaking?
A common assumption is that women’s compensation is lower than
136
men’s, because they have less time for rainmaking. But such comments
were rare in our study—a finding reinforced by PAR’s recent study of
part-time partners, which found that part-time equity partners (virtually
all of whom are women) tend to do as much, or more, rainmaking, as do

136. Cynthia Thomas Calvert et al., Project for Attorney Retention, Reduced Hours, Full
Success: Part-Time Partners in U.S. Law Firms 8, 14 (2009).
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Indeed, some comments indicated the opposite

• “Women . . . tend to be lone rangers at the firm (i.e. they are not part
of the big teams on big cases). . . . On the other hand, many of the
partners (all male) working for the leaders of the section serve as
‘support’ lawyers—they spend all their time billing hours on their
senior partners’ clients’ files. Naturally, the senior partner ensures
they are promoted in order to keep his kingdom growing . . . . The
women tend to leave and try to find a firm that rewards the ability to
generate business.”
• “I have . . . the distinct impression that [origination] . . . matters not at
all to determining my compensation as I have been categorized as a
‘worker bee.’”

More common were comments to the effect that respondents’ firms
did not provide women with equal opportunity to participate in client
pitches:
• “Women are routinely left out of client pitches and have to scream to
get the attention of marketing professionals at the firm. The firm
simply does not take female lawyers seriously.”
• “I have not been invited or gone to a beauty contest in the past three
years. My firm does not adequately compensate ‘service’ partners.”
• “While the compensation at my firm is on its face objective . . . I have
found that women who are ‘service’ partners do not have as many
opportunities to work on high-profile cases and clients. Those
opportunities more often than not go to men and as a result their
compensation is increased.”
• “Women are not groomed in the same way men are at the firm for
business development . . . . You have to be in the boys’ club to get the
origination, which is really the way power is measured at the
firm . . . . [T]hey are perceived as not being able to develop clients and
they are encouraged to keep their noses to the grindstone. Then when
they don’t have their own business, they are forced out. And no one
worries about this because the powers that be figure by this time the
women will be getting ready to have a baby, etc.”
• “Although I feel like I am well compensated and the compensation
system is fair currently, I do not think I have as many opportunities to
participate in pitches and other important matters as my male
counterparts.”
• “My concerns regarding partnership compensation are not about the
‘fairness’ of how the system compensates (I think the determinations
made are very fair in that they accurately compensate partners for
their contributions in past years), but rather about the ability of
women partners to get the types of opportunities and responsibilities
that generate the ‘objective’ (billable hours, client generation) and
‘subjective’ (management, client responsibility, trial experience)
performance that the system ultimately rewards.”

137. Id.
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The Reichman and Sterling study, based on interviews, found quite a
different dynamic at work:
I was certainly one of the higher billing partners that period of my time
there. But it was still hard to attract associates to work with me because
I was never one of the partners who was yelling at them that they had
to do my work . . . . It was very hard for me and it got to be not worth
the effort to try to put out what I needed to put out to get the
associates to stay on my work. They would tend to put my work and
down pick up somebody else’s work . . . . My clients were getting pissed
off . . . . I think the associates liked me. It certainly wasn’t a popularity
contest. It’s just that that’s the way their bread is buttered . . . . I had to
be head of the hiring committee, which meant that I had to interview
all these same [associates] who wouldn’t work for me later and to
persuade my partners to have interviews with them so that they could
138
ultimately go and work for them.
139

This partner quit her firm and opened a solo practice. Another
respondent said that the politics of her firm made it impossible for her to
keep practicing:
It’s actually one of the reasons I left private practice cause I had grown
my book to a point where I couldn’t service it myself any longer or I
was going to go nuts. I finally got to a point where I hired a new
associate dedicated to my work and she was very, very good and that
got recognized very quickly and people started to take her away—little
by little, bit by bit. What can you do? She needs to get out there and
work with other partners if she wants to move up the ladder internally
140
in the firm. I saw the handwriting on the wall . . . .

Over half of our respondents reported situations in which they had
participated in “beauty contests” but had not been included in the client
work that resulted. Over 70% of minority income partners, 58% of
minority equity partners, 55% of majority equity partners, and 48% of
majority income partners reported that in the last three years, they had
participated in successful client pitches in which they did not end up
billing a significant number of hours. Forty-two percent of majority and
minority equity partners, 48% of minority income partners, and 31% of
majority income partners reporting having this happen once or twice,
while 14% of majority equity partners, 18% of minority partners and 8%
of majority income partners had experienced this three or more times.
Respondents also reported that in the last three years, many had
participated in successful client pitches but did not receive a
proportionate share of the origination credit or otherwise have their
contribution recognized financially. Forty percent of majority equity
partners and 37% of majority income partners reported this experience.
Among minority partners, 52% of income partners and 39% of equity

138. Reichman & Sterling, supra note 5, at 57–58.
139. Id. at 57.
140. Id. at 64–65.
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partners reported this experience. This happened once or twice among
one-fourth of minority equity partners and majority income partners,
while 28% of majority equity partners and 35% of minority income
partners experienced this once or twice; a slightly smaller proportion of
majority equity and income partners (12% each) had encountered this
three or more times in the prior three years as compared to minority
partners (15%).
F.

Lack of Succession Planning

Who inherits the credit when an attorney leaves the firm? Firms that
have origination credit typically allow it to be passed on if an attorney
leaves a firm: Only 4-7% of respondents said their firms disallowed this.
Roughly one in three majority equity partners, and one in five majority
income partners reported no consistent approach, with minority partners
in between (29%). The most common system reported was that partners
with origination credit are allowed to decide who will inherit their
origination credit, with 26% of majority equity partners, 28% of minority
equity partners, and 30% of majority income partners reporting this
practice. Minority income partners were most likely (48%) to identify
this practice as their firm’s approach to succession planning for
origination credit. Much less common was for firm management to play a
role (6-14%). Clients rarely played a role in choosing their new lawyers
(1-3%). A surprising proportion of each group of partners did not know
how succession was handled at their firms: 24% of majority income
partners, 11% of majority equity partners, and 9% of minority partners.
Most comments said that the partner who “owns” the client chooses
the successor. A few felt this system had a negative effect on women:
• “Succession appears to consist of persons bequeathing the credit to
their ‘chosen person,’ w[ho] is typically a white male.”
• “Men are consistently provided with succession opportunities or the
opportunity to get credit for landing a client—women are not.”
• “When partners leave and their clients stay they have not been even
partially assigned to me as requested even though I have built
relationships with these clients and often do much of the work.”

Responses indicated that more firm involvement appears to be a trend.
• “If the originating attorney leaves the firm but the client stays, the
Compensation Committee may transfer the origination credit to
another shareholder who demonstrates that he or she is the primary
cause of the client’s continued use of the firm’s services.”
• “Often the current partner in charge has a large say . . . . However, the
firm is becoming more active in selecting successors. The firm does not
allow partners to pass on credit for a client without approval of
management.”
• “Successor is chosen based on the best interest of the client.”
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A few respondents mentioned that origination credit ended at their firms
if the originating attorney left the firm: “When a partner leaves, the
client is assigned to the firm in general.” Only a few comments indicated
that the client had a say in deciding what happens. For example: “Mostly,
subjective determined by [the] partner in charge, but firm management
occasionally ‘chooses’. . . . I bet clients sometimes pick too.”
A few comments described active firm involvement:
• “Our approach is to introduce a client to more than one originating
partner so there is a team that is available to service the account.”
• “We encourage each senior partner to come up with and propose a
plan to transition key clients. The plan is reviewed by the practice
group head and the Advisory Board. The focus is not on who becomes
the new ‘engagement partner’ but on making sure the client is
connected to enough people that it will remain with the firm.”

Clearly, in institutions in which women tend to be more junior partners,
systems that continue to reward lawyers for service rendered years ago
will disadvantage women far into the future.
G. Subjectivity
By a wide margin, most respondents had compensation systems that
combine objectivity and subjectivity: 85% of equity-partner respondents
reported such systems, while 10% had completely subjective systems,
and 4% had completely objective systems. Our respondents reported a
sharply higher percentage of systems that combine objectivity and
subjectivity, and a sharply lower percentage of firms that rely on
completely subjective systems than do medium and large firms in
general. One consultant’s study reported that only 32% of law firms with
100 or more lawyers had a combination of objectivity and subjectivity,
141
while 42% rely on totally subjective systems.
Altman Weil’s 2009 survey found that just over one-third of
respondents reported that 76% or more of total partner compensation at
142
their firms is subjective. An additional 35% of respondents reported
that some part of compensation was subjective, but said this component
143
counted for less than 75% of total compensation. Our respondents also
had a sharply lower percentage of purely objective systems: The Altman
Weil survey found that nearly one-third of law firms had compensation
144
systems with no subjective component. Both differences probably
reflect that our respondents were more likely to be in large law firms
than are lawyers in general, and that large law firms are more likely to

141. See Alan R. Olson, Subjective Law Firm Compensation Systems, Marketing and Origination,
Rep. to Legal Mgmt., Apr. 2003, at 6–7 (Altman Weil, Inc.).
142. Cotterman, supra note 30, at 9.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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have subjectivity as a significant part of their systems. Income and
minority partners reported similar findings. In other firms, every partner
votes on the compensation of every other partner, typically using
subjective criteria in the process. “Each lawyer can use whatever criteria
she wants to determine her vote . . . .”
A flood of comments stressed that law firm compensation is
subjective even when objective factors are considered. Some examples:
• “Subjective application of a list of 12 objective criteria.”
• “Articulated 10 factors but application is subjective.”
• “Factors related to compensation are published but decisions seem
totally random.”
• “There are ‘policies’ for determining compensation, including a
number of objective criteria regarding billings, hours, client
generation, and your history, but there is lots of room for subjective
variations.”
• “‘Numbers’ (amounts billed, amounts collected, origination, hours
worked) are considered; these are objective criteria. But how these
objective factors are weighed and how other factors are taken into
account is subjectively done by the executive committee . . . . [B]onuses
are given every year (totally within the discretion of the executive
committee.)”
• “Purportedly based on origination, managing, responsib[ility] and
working collections for three-year period, but decisions subjectively
made by Comp Committee.”

Subjectivity is inevitable and appropriate in setting law firm
compensation. A completely objective system is infeasible in most firms,
given the wide range of contributions made and roles played by various
partners. Yet decisions made on the basis of subjective criteria are
145
especially vulnerable to the influence of stereotypes and bias. The
stereotypes that emerge boost men but operate as a drag on women in
male-dominated workplaces. Such workplaces define competence in
ways that are considered a natural fit with the stereotypical man—
146
ambitious, aggressive, rational, direct —but an uneasy fit with the
147
stereotypical woman—who is seen as modest, selfless, and emotional.
Because stereotypes drive perception and memory, people tend to
notice and remember stereotype-consistent information better than

145. See Bielby, supra note 46, at 123 (“[P]ersonnel systems whose criteria for making decisions
are arbitrary and subjective are highly vulnerable to bias due to the influence of stereotypes . . . .”); see
also Susan T. Fiske & Shelley E. Taylor, Social Cognition 246–85 (1984) (discussing the default
mechanisms of social inference that operate most particularly in the absence of complete and/or
reliable information).
146. See Jeanette N. Cleveland et al., Women and Men in Organizations: Sex and Gender
Issues at Work 44 (2000).
147. Madeline E. Heilman, Description and Prescription: How Gender Stereotypes Prevent
Women’s Ascent Up the Organizational Ladder, 57 J. Soc. Issues 657, 658 (2001).
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148

stereotype-inconsistent information.
Because stereotypes drive
inference, observers tend to attribute behavior to stereotype-consistent
149
explanations rather than to stereotype-inconsistent ones. Consequently,
men’s successes tend to be attributed to abiding dispositions, while
women’s successes tend to be attributed to fleeting, outside conditions:
150
This pattern is often called the “he’s skilled, she’s lucky” syndrome.
The reverse is also true: Men’s failures tend to be attributed to outside
conditions (no one could have won before that judge) while women’s
tend to be attributed to stable personality traits (she lacks the
151
forcefulness to be a litigator). These simple principles account for the
sense, mentioned above, that women (and people of color) have to “try
152
twice as hard to get half as far.” Unfortunately, once stereotypes are
activated, they tend to reinforce themselves, as new information is
interpreted through the lens of stereotypes—information that then is
interpreted as further evidence of the proof of the stereotypes’
153
accuracy.
These processes appear to be at work in the lives of our
respondents. For example, several comments report that objective
factors sometimes are given different values for men and women.
• “Thus, some factors are ‘important’ if they justify paying a man,
especially a man with a family, . . . and other factors are ‘important’ if
they will justify paying a woman, especially a single woman, less.”
• “While statistics are considered in the process, instances of double and
triple counting for the same business [is] rampant among the boys’
club, while women rarely get the same level of credit unless they are in
a position to ‘walk’ the business.”

148. See generally David L. Hamilton & Jeffrey W. Sherman, Stereotypes, in 2 Handbook of
Social Cognition I (Robert S. Wyler. Jr. & Thomas K. Scrull eds., 2d ed. 1994) (summarizing two
decades of research on this phenomenon, called “illusory correlation”). For further discussion of this
trend, see Galen V. Bodenhausen & Robert S. Wyer, Jr., Effects of Stereotypes in Decision Making
and Information-Processing Strategies, 48 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 267, 280–81 (1985).
149. See Bodenhausen & Wyer, supra note 148, at 279–81.
150. See Jeffrey H. Greenhaus & Saroj Parasuraman, Job Performance Attributions and Career
Advancement Prospects: An Examination of Gender and Race Effects, 55 Organizational Behav. &
Hum. Decision Processes 273, 274, 276, 290 (1993); see also Janet K. Swim & Lawrence J. Sanna, He’s
Skilled, She’s Lucky: A Meta-Analysis of Observers’ Attributions for Women’s and Men’s Successes and
Failures, 22 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 507 (1996).
151. See Greenhaus & Parasuraman, supra note 150, at 274, 276, 290.
152. See supra Part I.D. and infra Part II.B.7.
153. See Bodenhausen & Wyer, supra note 148, at 279 (“The effects of activating a stereotype
appear to override the effects of other information available about the target. . . . [S]tereotypes
functioned as judgmental heuristics in interpreting the target’s behavior and why it occurred . . . .”);
Lucy Johnston, Resisting Change: Information-Seeking and Stereotype Change, 29 Eur. J. Soc.
Psychol. 799, 799 (1996) (finding that stereotype-preservation bias affected information gathering and
prevented modification of existing stereotypic beliefs); see also Greenhaus & Parasuraman, supra note
150, at 275–78 (discussing gender differences in performance attributions and how those attributions
inform and reinforce supervisors’ subsequent behavior toward their subordinates).
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• “Each of the items listed above assumes uniform application of the
factors. [T]hese items matter more for some partners but not for
others . . . . That should be a focus of whether women partners’
compensation is commensurate with that of their male colleagues.”
• “Again, depends on who is being compensated, especially with respect
to whom management favors. A factor that means nothing as [to] one
partner can be the reason to compensate another partner, if someone
on management wants to protect/cover that person.”

These comments indicate a specific pattern fed by the general principles
outlined above. Eric L. Uhlmann and Geoffrey L. Cohen found that
when two job candidates were considered for a male-dominated job,
respondents preferred the male candidate when he had more experience,
citing the importance of experience, but they still preferred the male
candidate when the male candidate had more education, citing the
154
importance of education. In both cases, a female candidate, who was
155
objectively very similar, lost out.
The same basic principles also drive another well-documented
pattern, called leniency bias, in which objective rules are applied
156
leniently to men but rigidly to women. Some responses demonstrate
this pattern:
• “My compensation was ‘adjusted’ those years I worked less than goal
due to young children. Several of my male colleagues have worked
equivalently under goal for years with no adjustments made. Instead,
I’m told that they have illness/family/other issues that we all must
support them through.”
• “One disparity I see is that male partners who experience a decline in
business due to factors outside their control are protected from a
reduction in their partnership share while the earnings of similarly
situated women partners decline rapidly and dramatically.”

Most of the patterns above link back to a basic precept: Men enjoy an
assumption of competence in male-dominated environments, while
157
women seem not to “fit.” As a result, women may find that they need
to prove themselves over and over again. A 1988 report concluded that
women lawyers felt they had to “work harder, do better and make fewer
mistakes” than men, and that they are “treated with a presumption of
incompetence,” whereas male lawyers enjoy a presumption of
158
competence that is “overcome only after numerous significant mistakes.”
154. See, e.g., Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, Constructed Criteria: Redefining Merit to
Justify Discrimination, 16 Psychol. Sci. 474, 475–77 (2005) (discussing unfettered discretion in hiring
criteria, and noting that criteria used to assess merit can be defined flexibly to favor certain groups).
155. Id. at 479.
156. See Marilynn B. Brewer, In-Group Favoritism: The Subtle Side of Intergroup Discrimination,
in Codes of Conduct: Behavioral Research into Business Ethics 164–67 (David M. Messick &
Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996).
157. See Madeline E. Heilman, Sex Bias in Work Settings: The Lack of Fit Model, 5 Res. Org.
Behav. 269, 280 (1983).
158. ABA Comm’n on Women in the Prof., Report to the House of Delegates 12 (1988).
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Our survey suggested that women still may have to prove themselves
over and over again. Some examples:
• “I firmly believe that the achievements of women in the firm are
routinely and systemically discounted and have confirmed that
through an analysis of compensation statistics. We are called upon to
contribute heavily in administrative time and commitment, to build big
books of business and bill [lots of] hours to ‘earn’ our place.”
• “There are clearly discrepancies with male and female partners with
equal or better numbers from an objective standpoint. If you want to
appeal, you are appealing to the same seven people who made that
decision.”
• “It is very difficult with our firm to figure out their logic. There are
several male partners whose numbers are significantly less than female
equity partners but their compensation is dramatically higher.”

A quite different type of bias emerges from the assumption that
men are breadwinners while women are not. This leads to the unspoken
sense that men with children “need” the money, whereas women with
children do not, because they have men supporting them.
• “Perception with respect to whether the partner ‘needs’ the income,
which leads to less pay for women (particularly married women) than
that for men (particularly men with children to support).”
• “In setting a female partner’s compensation, it is my impression that
the firm considers whether a woman will have children [and] take the
allotted maternity leave, whether the woman will return to work, and
whether the woman will return full- or part-time. All of these factors
appear to negatively impact a woman’s compensation and equity
partner track.”
• “[T]he firm seems to use whatever factors justify paying men more and
women less, particularly men with families.”
• “For example, that a man, recently divorced, was now ‘effectively a
single parent’ and therefore needed a raise, while [everyone else was]
being cut . . . .”
• “I am expecting in January. In December, met billing obligations, got
de minimis bonus. Told the firm would be flexible with me in future.
Never asked for flexibility. Just wanted fair bonus for past year.”

Decisionmaking that is subjective and unchecked gives free rein to
gender stereotyping. This stereotyping reflects the unspoken sense that
men inherently possess the skills one needs to succeed in the law, a skill
set which, both historically and traditionally, is associated with men and
159
masculinity.
159. See Peter Glick, Trait-Based and Sex-Based Discrimination in Occupational Prestige,
Occupational Salary, and Hiring, 25 Sex Roles 351, 365 (1991); Peter Glick, Korin Wilk & Michele
Perreault, Images of Occupations: Components of Gender and Status in Occupational Stereotypes,
32 Sex Roles 565, 570 (1995); Peter Glick, Cari Zion & Cynthia Nelson, What Mediates Sex
Discrimination in Hiring Decisions?, 55 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 178, 185–86 (1988); Heilman,
supra note 157, at 280; see also Joan Acker, Hierarchies, Jobs, Bodies: A Theory of Gendered
Organizations, 4 Gender & Soc’y 139, 151–53 (1990).
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H. The Perils of Self-Advocacy for Women
It can also be referred to as “law of the jungle”—those who fight for
credit and are in the inner circle get origination credit.

The most common forms of input into partner compensation
decisions reported by our respondents were objective reports of billables,
such as collections and originations: 92-94% of respondents reported this
type of input. The next most common input was partners’ written selfadvocacy, reported by 69% of minority-partner respondents, and 77-79%
of other respondents. Next most common were evaluations by heads of
practice groups or departments—reported by 49% of minority equity
partners and 66–68% of other respondents—followed by evaluations by
other partners—reported by 21% minority income, 41% income, and
43% equity partners—and committee interviews—reported by 28–29%
minority, 35% income, and 47% equity partners. In a small percentage of
firms, as noted above, each partner votes on the compensation of every
other partner.
A number of respondents commented that they needed to fill out
self-assessments but that, in practice, these seemed to play a limited role
in compensation decisions. Said one: “They say self-assessments and
meeting with partners are considered but they are not.” Another
responded, “[p]artners are asked to fill out self-assessment[s], but it is
unclear how much they matter.” Sometimes self-evaluations are
combined with direct lobbying of the decisionmaker(s): “Partners write a
self-evaluation, but my assessment is that they have no impact. Numbers
and individual ‘lobbying’ of the firm chair seem to affect compensation.”
Where self-assessments and personal lobbying are important,
women may face another facet of the double bind. Women often
encounter pushback for self-promotion. To quote one study, “[s]elfpromotion may be instrumental for [establishing competence] . . . yet
women who self-promote may suffer social reprisals for violating gender
160
prescriptions to be modest.” Women may be reluctant to self-promote
for fear they will be seen as unfeminine and pushy. In short, “women
may be stuck in a Catch-22 in which they are damned if they do self161
promote, and damned if they do not.”
All this affects women partners. Most systems rely on partners to
put their best case forward for increased compensation, either in writing,
or in person, or both. In some firms, this self-advocacy is directed to the
head of the firm. In others, it is directed to management or compensation
committee members. In a few firms, it is directed to every one of one’s

160. Rudman, supra note 114, at 629.
161. Laurie A. Rudman, To Be or Not To Be (Self-Promoting): The Consequences of
Counterstereotypical Impression Management, in Power and Influence in Organizations 287, 290
(Roderick M. Kramer & Margaret A. Neale eds., 1998).
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partners. This places many women partners in the situation of having to
have one or many hallway conversations where they detail their
accomplishments—and may well face one or more crucial partners who
find this distasteful: “You certainly think highly of yourself, don’t you?”
may be the reaction.
I.

De-Equitized Partners
Some people want to make much more money at the cost of others’
compensation . . . . [Others] think we have to have a stronger upper tier
of compensation to attract laterals. The result, in my mind, is fewer
people making equity partner and more existing partners being deequitized.

Fourteen percent of the majority income partners, 12% of minority
partners, and 3% of the majority equity partners had reported that they
162
had been de-equitized. In each group, the total number who responded
to this question was small, so these numbers should be treated with
caution: based on their self-identifications, eight minority partners and
twenty majority partners said they had been de-equitized.
The most common factor identified by the equity partners was a low
level of originations (63%), trailed distantly by low billable hours (25%).
Among the income partners, the most common factor was a firm’s
decision to increase profits per partner (52%), trailed by low billable
hours (30%) and low originations (26%).
For income partners who had been de-equitized, the most common
factor was their firms’ decision to increase profits per partner (52%),
followed by low billable hours (30%) and low origination of new clients
(26%).
Minority partners, half of whom were equity partners, were about as
likely as majority income partners to have been de-equitized (12%). For
them, the most common factor was a firm’s decision to increase its profits
per partner (63%), trailed distantly by low new client origination (38%)
and low existing partner expansion (38%).
A small number of the comments reflected a decision by an
individual partner to cut back her commitments due to childcare
responsibilities:
• “I had twins (so three children) and decided that I wanted to reduce
the commitment [while they were young] to client development and
marketing, which was expected of equity partners . . . . I was told that I
would be welcomed back as an equity partner in the future. I regained
equity partner status when the girls were ten.”

162. Given that de-equitized partners, by definition, are no longer equity partners, respondents to
this question who reported themselves equity partners most likely were de-equitized at a different
firm.
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• “I was a young equity partner and had just had twins (in addition to a
6 year old), so my time/attention to client development and marketing
was limited. I chose to be ‘de-equitized’ as a way to balance the
demands at the time. Ten years later, I returned to equity.”

Note that, in both cases, the firms matched an “off-ramp” with an “onramp” and gained a happy and productive partner as a result. Yet other
respondents’ stories lacked a happy ending:
“[Why I was de-equitized] was never fully explained to me. The head
office instructed our office to reduce the number of equity partners,
and I was the one chosen (during my pregnancy, even though I had
significant revenue generation and billable hours).”

Other personal reasons included medical issues, and one attorney
who had undertaken a transgender transition. Still other respondents
were de-equitized for work-related reasons: “This was my decision, as a
way to continue working but reduce the hours and the responsibility for
training associates and feeding work to a specific group of associates. I
can now focus on developing business and helping in firm management
with less concern about billable hours.”
A few respondents clearly felt burned by their firms’ decisions to deequitize them. Several respondents tied decisions to de-equitize to their
firms’ desire to increase profits per partner, or profits per equity partner:
• “I was asked to handle a significant pro-bono [matter] and my ‘profits
per partner’ numbers weren’t acceptable.”
• “Our compensation system has been changing significantly in the last
few years as profits per equity partner (versus profits per partner) is
used by more firms to tout their finances to merger targets. It is
becoming much harder to become an equity partner and I anticipate
that a number of partners will be de-equitized this year. I had to fight
like hell to avoid that last year.”

Other scholarship has questioned whether de-equitization is a
significant trend in law firm compensation. One recent study followed
163
the attrition of 100,000 lawyers at 285 law firms. The report found that
“[d]espite anecdotal evidence that partners were affected by layoffs
through the ‘de-equitazation’ process[,] . . . we find no evidence of large
direct effect on partners. Even at firms with the largest layoffs, partner
164
attrition rates have been at standard levels throughout the process.”

163. Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, What Drives Turnover and Layoffs at Large Law Firms? 15–16
(Mar. 2, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/LegalProfession/
documents/oyerlayoffs.pdf.
164. Id. at 12.
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II. Where to Go from Here?
Compensation represents a tangible expression of a person’s value. It
defines lifestyle, position within a community, status among peers,
friends and family, and measures the relative importance of the
165
individual to the organization.

No wonder people care a lot about compensation. This study shows
some strong racial and gender effects in current law firm compensation
systems—yet changing these systems is not something one does lightly.
Someone’s ox is always gored, which can lead to serious interfirm
conflicts. According to Altman Weil consultant James D. Cotterman,
“Generally it will take two or three years to move from an existing
166
system to a new one.”
Nonetheless, a discussion of best practices is important for several
reasons. First, this report provides some helpful guidance to women on
how to choose their law firms: Some firms have compensation systems
that work well for women, while others have systems that present
significant career difficulties for at least some of their women partners.
Before women choose their law firms, they should find out some crucial
facts about its compensation system.
A discussion of best practices is also important for law firms. The
discussion below will highlight a striking conclusion: the aspects of law
firms’ compensation systems that open the door to hidden bias—against
lawyers of color as well as women—also have been widely criticized by
law firm management consultants. Failing to address the problems with
compensation systems will have a disproportionate impact both on
women and on lawyers of color, but good management will help
167
everyone—and the firm’s bottom line.
This Part will first address the common claim that the current design
of law firm compensation systems simply reflects economic reality. It
then will proceed to a discussion of best practices.
A. Economic Reality?
Our survey data confirm that, while many firms say they consider a
wide range of factors in setting compensation, our study respondents
perceive that the key factors in most law firm compensation systems are
origination and hours worked, measured in various ways.
Is this not just economic reality? After all, if partners do not bring in
work, no law firm can survive. Yet many consultants believe that existing

165. Cotterman, supra note 33, at 4.
166. Cotterman, supra note 30, at 10.
167. See generally Lotte Bailyn, Breaking the Mold: Women, Men, and Time in the New
Corporate World (1993) (describing current expectations of career success, the cost to both
employers and employees for following these expectations, and the potential gains if this traditional
mold could be broken).
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compensation systems do not incentivize behavior that is in the best
long-term interest of firms. Management guru David Maister comes out
swinging:
Many law firms have discovered you can make money if you work
everybody very, very hard and really slash your costs and don’t care
about how people—partners, associates, or staff—feel about their work
lives. ‘Let’s succeed by working more hours and ever-decreasing
amount of support’ is not the most sophisticated piece of business
168
thinking I have ever heard.

Not surprisingly, others take a softer line. Notes the Vice President and
General Counsel of Hildebrandt Baker Robbins Inc.:
[W]hen Partner A needs help from another specialist, Partner B,
Partner B will either expressly or implicitly refuse to give his best
service to Partner A’s client because Partner A will collect the
origination fee forever. Partner B figures, “I’m better off finding my
169
own client, rather than working on Howard’s client.”

As previously discussed, Joel A. Rose, a law firm management
consultant, highlights the perverse incentives that can plague law firm
compensation systems: “Tensions can develop when the direction of the
170
firm’s compensation system is unclear or only receives lip service.” He
cites several examples:
• When “the firm verbally encourages partners to ‘delegate client
work to others within the firm,’ but, in practice, it overcompensates
171
for revenue collected from partners’ personal production . . . .”
• When “the firm verbally encourages partners to work together to
develop business from existing and potential clients but rewards
172
individuals at the expense of joint origination credit . . . .”
• When “the firm verbally encourages partners to perform
consequential nonbillable work to progress the firm (e.g.,
marketing, enhancing the firm’s image, training, management of the
firm and its substantive practice areas, etc.) but rewards those
activities marginally in favor of billable hours/revenue from
173
personal production.”
Compensation systems that focus on origination also give partners
incentives to bring in clients “regardless of client quality, not only in
terms of putting the firm at greater risk of claims, but also at greater odds
of writing off fees. Since D gets a share as originator without doing the

168. David Maister, Are Law Firms Manageable?, Am. L., Apr. 2006, at 96, 100.
169. Compensation: A Law Firm’s Pandora’s Box: Origination, Profitability and Hours Worked All
Add Up, Merrill’s Ill. Legal Times, Sept. 1996, available at 1996 WLNR 6402767 (quoting Joel F.
Henning, Senior Vice President and General Counsel of Hildebrandt Baker Robbins Inc.).
170. Rose, supra note 62, at 3.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 3–4.
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work, the write-off falls disproportionately on those doing the work.”
Peter J. Winders, a partner with Carlton Fields in Florida, is particularly
harsh in his criticism of origination credit:
Make a rule that Brown, the corporate lawyer, cannot dabble in
litigation. Thus, Brown is theoretically forbidden from handling the
litigation, but if he goes ahead and does it anyway, he is rewarded for
doing so. Unworthy clients are to be avoided, but compensation is paid
for originating one. Crime does in fact pay, but one person is appointed
as cop to keep him from doing it. And of course since the cop work is
underpaid (it is non-billable, and not provided for in the system) there
is a temptation to do it only sporadically. It is like hoping to stop the
importation of drugs from Columbia [sic] by decreasing penalties and
175
manning law enforcement with unpaid volunteers.

Winders also highlights the perverse incentives that stem from a focus on
partners’ billable hours. Each partner “is tempted to favor ‘his own’
clients, so long as he has plenty to do . . . [over] stepchilding” his
partners’ clients’ work, even if that is of greater long-term value to the
176
firm.
Consultants warn that an excessive focus on long work hours
177
incentivizes behavior harmful both to clients and to law firms. When
firms place too much emphasis on partners’ billable hours, partners lack
sufficient motivation to “develop and delegate client work to others
178
within and outside their area of expertise,” notes Rose. He continues:
Most firms that place a premium on revenue from partners’ personal
production find that partners tend to hold their client relationships too
close to their vests, they frequently hoard client work rather than
spread it around to other partners . . . partners perform work that
could be performed by associates . . . partners do billable work when
their better use for the law firm is to generate additional business from
existing and potential clients, and lawyers may perform work outside
their princip[al] areas of expertise that others in the firm could perform
179
more effectively and efficiently.

Another consultant, Michael J. Anderson, notes “liability risks when
180
partners perform work in areas in which they are not proficient,” while
another author has argued that the structural conflicts of interests set up

174. Peter J. Winders, The Ideal Law Firm Compensation System, 16 Prof. Law, no. 2, 2005 at 1, 5.
175. Id. at 4–5. See generally Steven Kerr, On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for B,
18 Acad. Mgmt. J. 769 (1975) (discussing reward systems that reward discouraged behaviors, while
failing to reward desired behaviors).
176. Winders, supra note 174, at 4.
177. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 63, at 5; Winders, supra note 174, at 7.
178. Cf. Rose, supra note 63, at 5 (explaining that rewarding partners billing and collecting for
work for which they are the responsible partner, but not the originating partner, motivates them to
develop and delegate work inside and outside their area).
179. Id.
180. Michael J. Anderson, Edge Int’l, Partner Compensation: Systems Used in Professional
Service Firms 8 (2001).
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by current compensation systems place lawyers at risk of violating the
181
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
Our respondents reported a variety of perverse incentives at work in
their firms. One noted that a high billable hours requirement can lead to
padding of bills: “The high billable hour requirement encourages
padding . . . . It’s a system with few realistic incentives other than to work
yourself silly or lie about it.” More common were reports of client
hoarding:
• “Several senior partners have retired in the past five years and the
work simply went away—no one had planned for succession, in my
view because the partners were busy hoarding credit to advance their
careers, and not to look at either the client’s interests or the law firm’s.
Dysfunctional compensation systems can really cripple a firm.”
• “After seeing the two systems at work, it seems to be that lock-step is
much fairer to women. There is substantially less hoarding of clients,
exclusion from contacts, elbowing women out once the client gets in
the door (after we’re trotted out for appearance of diversity).”
• “I have expressed my dissatisfaction with the compensation system,
which I believe encourages partners to hoard work, not to develop
teams and not to institutionalize clients.”

Other respondents identified other behaviors not in the long-term
interest of their firms:
• “As a minority female, I am clearly in an outer circle, and at the mercy
of others. Efforts have been made to thwart my business development
in my respective practice group. It is very frustrating.”
• “[The b]illing partner is said not to matter at all, except that there is a
trend, since this is a multi-office firm, of writing off time of lawyers in
other offices and otherwise gaming the system, and this is the power of
the billing partner. So while the ‘status’ is not said to be important, the
position is important nonetheless.”

Some consultants fault compensation systems that focus on
origination and personal production for focusing on revenue, rather than
on the bottom line. Such systems stress cash flow over cost controls and
ignore the need to incentivize the investments necessary to ensure long182
term viability of a business organization. The failure to value the kinds
of human capital and management activities that are vital to the long-

181. Edward A. Bernstein, Structural Conflicts of Interest: How A Law Firm’s Compensation
System Affects Its Ability to Serve Clients, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1261, 1262 (arguing that the shift away
from lockstep sets up incentives that can cause partners to give poor legal advice).
182. John W. Olmstead, Cutting the Pie, Determining Partner Compensation, Olmstead & Assocs.
(2005), http://www.olmsteadassoc.com/resource-center/determining-partner-compensation.aspx
(“Compensation systems should do more than simply allocate the pie—they should reinforce the
behaviors and efforts that the firm seeks from its attorneys. Many firms are discovering that desired
behaviors and results must go beyond short term fee production and must include contributions in
areas such as marketing, mentoring, firm management, etc. to ensure the long term viability of the
firm.”).
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term vitality of a business organization is apparent from the responses to
the survey. Many firms now operate on a modified “eat what you kill”
system, which in its pure form, notes Anderson, results in
a total lack of responsibility for managing the entity. Because no one
gets recognition for non-billable time spent there is often a void when
it comes to firm management, training of juniors, firm marketing or
human resources . . . . The system creates no need for collegiality other
than as a method for partners to market other partners for work for
183
their clients.

As noted above, even law firm and practice group management are rated
far below the individual profit-center factors. Other forms of institutional
investment play little, if any, role in law firm compensation.
“The most advanced method is to look at how groups are
184
performing,” says Cotterman. “You need some element of compensation
that recognizes group success and performance. You want to make sure
185
compensation rewards collaboration.” Our data indicate that this trend
is still in the birthing stage. Some comments signaled it, as when one
respondent reported that “associate profit of the practice group/office”
was part of the compensation formula. Yet only 4% of income partners
and 11% of equity partners felt that teamwork was very important in
determining compensation. More progress is evident if one widens the
scope of inquiry: 32% of income partners and 46% of equity partners felt
that teamwork was “important” or “very important.” Yet both figures
trailed measures reflective of hours worked and origination by a very
wide margin. Even more striking, from an economic standpoint, is how
rarely “effective leveraging of associates” plays a role in law firm
compensation. This is, of course, vital both from the viewpoint of the
firm, to enhance profitability, and from the viewpoint of clients, to
ensure cost-effectiveness. Yet rewarding leveraging remains rare: It is
virtually never a major factor in setting compensation and was listed as
“important” or “very important” by fewer than half of our respondents.
A bit more progress is evident in redesigning origination credits to
incentivize teamwork. Roughly one-third of respondents noted that
cross-selling and/or expanding work for an existing client is a very
important factor. This trend is even stronger if we widen the inquiry:
84% of equity partners and roughly three-fourths (77%) of income
partners listed these activities as either “important” or “very important”
in the setting of compensation. It thus seems that law firms are well on
their way to encouraging teamwork with respect to gaining clients, but

183. Anderson, supra note 180, at 11.
184. Telephone Interview with James D. Cotterman, Consultant, Altman Weil, Inc. (Feb. 24,
2009).
185. Id.
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they have a long way to go in incentivizing teamwork with respect to
servicing clients.
Another problem with the design of law firm compensation systems
is the undervaluing of long-term investments. Peter Winders highlights
the perverse incentives that arise when “nobody is paid for minding the
store.” Partners are incentivized to
avoid committee assignments, recruiting interviews and other time
consuming duties that benefit the firm because they do not benefit him
monetarily. He can then claim he brings in more money than anybody,
ignoring, as the formula does, the fact that the other duties are
186
essential if the firm is to thrive.

One point that does not appear in the consultant literature, but is
suggested by our survey, is that the attrition of women partners, which is
higher than that of male partners, is sometimes linked with the
perception of gender bias in compensation. Said one respondent:
“A key motivating factor in my decision to leave the firm was that I
learned that my base salary and bonus were lower than those of a male
peer (same law school graduating class, similar prior work experience,
similar expertise, same practice group) despite the fact that my work
product was consistently in demand and I was consistently busy,
whereas he had trouble maintaining a solid workload and many
partners expressed concerns about the quality of his work.”

Of course, when a partner leaves, she takes her book of business with
her. This is a cost of current compensation practices at some firms that
has, to our knowledge, never been noted in the literature.
If the long-term economic viability of law firms does not explain
contemporary law firm compensation systems, what does explain them?
We posed that question to James J. Sandman. He first addressed the
overvaluation of hours worked: “Rainmakers make the argument all the
time, ‘Measuring me in terms of the hours I work doesn’t make sense—
187
that’s not the best use of my time.’” The reason partners’ billable hours
survive has to do with lawyers’ skill sets. Rainmaking skills are not
equally distributed across the lawyer population. Other partners can
generate revenue for the firm more easily by working a lot of hours. The
many risk-averse partners who do not want to gamble their
compensation on their business-generating success feel that maximizing
their billable hours as service partners gives them more control over and
188
certainty about their compensation.
The result, Sandman continued, is that
certain things the firm needs in the long term are not valued. The trend
in partner compensation is toward trying to measure the individual
partner’s economic contribution to the firm. This tends to devalue less

186. Winders, supra note 174, at 4.
187. Telephone Interview with James J. Sandman, supra note 95.
188. Id.
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tangible but nevertheless important attributes that are not easily
measured. Teamwork? A partner who cites that as his or her best
189
argument for compensation would be considered a lame advocate.

In summary, many commentators feel that current compensation
systems overvalue individual cash flow measures and undervalue
institutional investment measures. Our data indicate some movement
away from compensation systems that create incentives mismatched with
firms’ long-term strategic goals. Yet the key features that have been
widely criticized by consultants as creating perverse incentives remain
robust in the law firms of our respondents.
B. Best Practices
This study suggests that many law firms could benefit from changes
to their compensation systems. Such changes are not easy: Abrupt and
controversial changes to a firm’s compensation system can easily lead the
firm to break up. Yet gradual progress towards fairer and more effective
compensation practices is, in the opinion of many of our respondents,
clearly needed. These include:
1. Increasing transparency;
2. Benchmarking;
3. Improving diversity on compensation committees and introducing
other checks on bias and in-group favoritism;
4. Examining the billable hours threshold;
5. Redesigning the origination credit;
6. Creating a diverse committee that handles disputes over reward
allocation, particularly origination credit;
7. Taking proactive steps to check the hidden bias that will
otherwise surely emerge in the context of compensation systems;
8. Ensuring a process that does not penalize women for selfadvocacy; and
9. Conforming to standard business practices by linking
compensation to individuals’ contributions to the long-term
viability of the firm.
1. Increasing Transparency
The path to becoming a billing partner is varied, with inconsistencies,
and there is no official guidance as to how one becomes a billing
partner. Sometimes it is just who gets the file open first; sometimes it is
the partner with the most political clout. . . . There is no consistency
and no one to turn to for guidance; there are no rules. Yet this is
[important] to the overall determination of partner compensation.

A system that is not clearly and formally explained to everyone
means that, to gain the knowledge necessary to understand the system,

189. Id.
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one needs to rely on informal networks and relationships with people in
power. This situation will disadvantage out-groups, which in most law
firms means that it will disadvantage disproportionate numbers of
women and people of color. Informal, opaque systems also will
disadvantage many white men who are too shy or introverted to know
the right people and the ropes.
A best practice is to write a memo that explains clearly how a firm’s
compensation system works, and provides for each new partner an
introductory session with an existing partner-mentor to explain the
system and to answer questions. Of course, the partner-mentor needs to
be someone who actually understands the compensation system: As our
survey indicates, many partners do not.
When the compensation system is changed, this also needs to be
clearly explained. This probably will be best handled in small meetings:
In large meetings, people will be reluctant to ask questions, and one-on190
one meetings are likely to yield inconsistency in the information given.
A more basic point is that firms need to understand what factors
actually play a major role in a firm’s compensation—to talk about
realities rather than aspirations. Gaining this information often will
require a statistical analysis to identify what those factors are, as opposed
to what factors are announced to have an influence. This kind of
statistical analysis typically will require an outside consultant—but this is
a type of analysis familiar to consultants who specialize in compensation
systems.
A final point is that firms need to understand whether those factors
that play an important role in elevation to partnership are different from
those factors that play an important role in setting partner compensation.
If different factors have more influence on setting partner compensation
than on elevation to partnership, firms need to inform new partners of
this fact. Again, formalizing this kind of information process can avoid
in-group favoritism—where “those in the know” succeed, while those
who are not in the know tend to fail. Allowing in-group favoritism to
flourish will disadvantage not only women, but also people of color,
LGBT lawyers, and perhaps others.

190. E-mail from James J. Sandman to Joan C. Williams (Apr. 4, 2010, 6:43 PM) (on file with
Author).
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Benchmarking

The system is effectively feudal. Compensation is centralized with a
very small group of partners. Because voting is weighted, the firm chair
knows exactly how many votes he needs to control the firm and he
pays the top tier enough to buy their loyalty. The dominant factor is
origination credit, but there are virtually no rules or guidelines and so
credit is a free for all, with the strongest usually winning.

A first step is to establish baseline information on the percentage of
revenues and/or profits generated by, and credited to, women lawyers
191
and lawyers of color. The second, and perhaps most important step is
to implement regular monitoring and analysis of the impact of a given
compensation system on out-groups, including women and people of
192
color.
This type of benchmarking is important in order to control the kind
of biases that occur even in organizations where good intentions abound.
A recent study of a business with an elaborate performance evaluation
process, and a strong commitment to merit-based compensation systems,
found that women and people of color nonetheless got lower raises when
supervisors took the evaluations and awarded raises, without a process to
193
check for bias at that step of the process.
194
To quote a well-known phrase, “what gets measured gets done.”
To put this differently, “[i]f you’re not keeping score, you’re only
195
practicing.” If systematic differentials in compensation by race and/or
sex emerge, further steps can be initiated. Given the wide range in
different types of compensation systems, probably the best advice is to
call in a consultant to analyze where the problems arise and how best to
address them.
3. Improving Diversity on Compensation Committees and
Introducing Other Checks on Bias and In-Group Favoritism
In our respondents’ firms, the committees in charge of
compensation were remarkably white, and remarkably male. This creates
the perfect conditions for in-group favoritism, which systematically
disadvantages women and people of color of both sexes. It is important
to note that having a single woman or a single person of color on a
committee often increases the risk of creating the unhealthy dynamics

191. Nat’l Ass’n of Women Lawyers, Actions for Advancing Women Into Law Firm
Leadership: Report of the NAWL National Leadership Summit 20 (July 2008) [hereinafter NAWL,
Summit Report].
192. Bielby, supra note 46, at 126 (detailing the need for such monitoring).
193. Emilio J. Castilla, Gender, Race, and Meritocracy in Organization Careers, 113 Am. J. Soc.
1479, 1482 (2008).
194. Maureen Giovannini, What Gets Measured Gets Done: Achieving Results Through Diversity
and Inclusion, 27 J. for Quality & Participation 21, 26 (2004).
195. Oral Communication with James Potter, Senior Vice President, Gen. Counsel, and Sec’y of
Del Monte Foods, and Chair of the Advisory Board of Project for Attorney Retention (Spring 2009).
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associated with tokenism. For example, when only one woman is on an
important committee, her sex can become so salient that she may feel the
need to judge women more harshly to prove that she is not favoring
women. Or she may feel that every time she opens her mouth her
comments are taken as representing all women. A variety of dynamics
196
can emerge. In short, heterogeneous committees can provide a break in
bias.
The fact that many committees in charge of compensation are
elected may contribute to those committees’ lack of diversity. In this
context, it is worth noting that many respondents said that although the
committee in charge of compensation, in theory, is elected, in practice,
the election typically rubber-stamped candidates that have already been
197
chosen by the powers that be. One useful approach, if that firm has a
separate compensation committee, may be for the management
committee to propose a diverse slate of candidates for the compensation
committee.
A final practice that exists in some firms can help reduce in-group
favoritism in the operation of compensation committees: the rule that no
partner’s compensation can rise more than 10% while he or she is serving
198
on the comp committee. Said Barbara Caufield, equity partner at
Dewey & LeBoeuf, “We used to do this. I don’t know why we ever
stopped. It was very effective in ensuring that nobody stayed too long on
199
the compensation committee!”
4. Examining the Billable Hours Threshold
NAWL’s 2007 study found that a high billable hours requirement
is correlated with a dramatic increase in the wage gap between men and
200
women. The gender gap was $140,000 at firms with high hours
requirements, $73,000 at firms with no hours requirement, and $51,000 at
firms that required partners to log billable hours lower than the median
201
for all firms.
Billable hours inevitably play a significant role in the level of
partner compensation. Yet two different models exist for taking billable
hours into account. One requires all partners to meet a certain billablehours threshold in order to receive all the credit available for the
billable-hours component of attorney compensation, on the theory that
billable hours are only one type of contribution partners need to make
for firms to flourish. The other system rewards the attorneys who work

196. Kanter, supra note 41, at 238–40.
197. Telephone Interview with Cathy Salvatore, Dir. of Career Dev. (Mar. 5, 2010).
198. Personal Communication with Barbara Caufield, Partner, Dewey & LeBeouf (Mar. 18, 2010).
199. Id.
200. Nat’l Ass’n of Women Lawyers, National Survey on Retention and Promotion of
Women in Law Firms 13 (2007).
201. Id.
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the most hours, signaling that billing hours is a critical contribution to a
firm’s long-term financial viability.
The threshold approach to billable hours was used in only a small
minority of our respondents’ firms. The predominant system presumably
was one in which attorneys who work the longest hours tend to receive
increased compensation even if, for example, a partner could be
increasing a firm’s profitability more by leveraging associates better,
decreasing unwanted attrition among valued attorneys, or moving from
lower- to higher-margin practice areas. Because many more men than
women have two-person careers in which they can rely on their partner
202
to take care of all matters outside of work, a most-hours-wins systems
disproportionately disadvantages women partners. In addition, in the
opinion of many law firm consultants, systems focused heavily on billable
hours are more than just not economically justified, they also introduce
perverse incentives, most notably the hoarding of work, and
inefficiencies that are detrimental to clients’ interests.
5. Redesigning the Origination Credit
Sixty percent of firms in the survey do not formally award
origination credit. Yet even in firms without formal origination credit,
origination often plays a central role in the setting of law firm
compensation. Old-fashioned origination credit could usefully be
redesigned in a number of ways:
Origination credit should not be inheritable. If the purpose of
origination credit is to incentivize lawyers to bring in new clients, it is
hard to discern the rationale for allowing the partner who “owns” the
client to pass on origination credit to whomever he or she wants. This
practice has negative effects both on diversity and on the perceived
fairness of a firm’s compensation system.
Reward teams, not individuals. The point of a law firm is to build
teams of lawyers that, together, can serve a client’s interests better than a
203
sole practitioner could. As noted above, consultants often advocate
systems that recognize a variety of contributions to a given client’s work.
One step in this direction is the common practice of dividing credit
among three or more attorneys: the one who brought in the work, the
billing partner, the partner who manages the client relationship, and the
partners who actually do the work. Obviously, if the weight given to
origination credit swamps the other factors considered, the resulting
system will differ little from old-fashioned origination credit. Another
alternative is to shift away from origination credit, towards an analysis of
whose work currently binds a given client to the firm. Fewer than one-infive majority equity partners and only roughly one-in-six income partners

202. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.
203. See Burk & McGowan, supra note 10, at 64–67.
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and minority equity partners reported this kind of system when asked
which factors were considered “very important” in setting compensation.
Yet a majority of firms appear to already be engaged in this calculation:
66% of majority equity partners, 63% of minority equity partners, 60%
of majority income partners and 45% of minority income partners said
this factor was either “important” or “very important.”
Origination credit by matter, not by client. A complementary practice
is to reward origination credit according to who brings in a given matter,
rather than to who first introduced the client to the firm. Another
recommended practice is that any expansion of the work goes not to first
contact, but rather to the expander and spread among the other
secondary actors. This type of distribution is important because women
and minorities are more likely to be expanders than first contacts.
Sunsets. Some firms have a three-year sunset on origination credit.
“At that point,” said Alan R. Olson of Altman Weil, “either new
business credit ceases or is reduced. Other compensation credits, such as
billing attorney credit and working attorney credit, would remain in most
204
systems and palliate the abrupt reduction in new business credit.”
Sunsets recognize the importance of origination, while also ensuring that
different lawyers have relationships with a given client, to ensure that the
client stays with the firm even if a single attorney on the team serving the
client leaves.
Pitch credit. A pervasive complaint by both women and people of
color is that they are invited on pitches in order to appeal to in-house
departments that seek diversity—but then are given no origination credit
for doing so. This could be eliminated by a clearly stated and widely
disseminated policy to the effect that, if a woman or person of color is
invited on a client pitch, that attorney needs to be given part of any
origination credit that results from the pitch—and part of the work.
6. Creating a Diverse Committee That Handles Disputes over
Reward Allocation, Particularly Origination Credit
Not only the system of reward allocation, but also the process for
settling disputes, can make a tremendous difference for women and
people of color. This study shows clearly that the current system, in
which origination credit contests are left to be negotiated privately
between the contesting partners is having a highly negative effect on
many women and attorneys of color. This is precisely the kind of
context—out of the public eye, with no oversight whatsoever—in which
hidden bias flourishes. NAWL recommends that firms establish “a

204. Alan R. Olson, How Law Firms Use Formulaic Systems to Reward Business Development,
22 Counsel, May 2003, at 14–15.
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powerful and diverse oversight committee” charged with resolving
205
disputes over origination credit.
7. Taking Proactive Steps to Check the Hidden Bias That Will
Otherwise Surely Emerge in the Context of Compensation
Systems
The first step is to look very carefully at law firm compensation
systems that are totally subjective. While these may work well in some
small firms, they present very serious risks of gender and racial bias.
These systems also has serious drawbacks from a business standpoint,
which is why, as one consulting firms notes delicately, “Altman Weil’s
206
consultants find it difficult to justify totally subjective systems.” If a
firm has a totally subjective system, benchmarking to assess whether it is
creating racial and gender disparities is even more important.
Even where a firm’s system is not totally subjective, subjectivity is
an inevitable part of most firms’ compensation systems. If biases are
unmonitored and unchecked, both women and attorneys of color often
will find themselves having to “try twice as hard” to make half as much.
This occurs, as noted above, because the successes of women (and the
207
literature is much the same with respect to people of color ) will tend to
be overlooked or attributed to quirks of fate, while evidence of their
failures and limitations will tend to be noticed, remembered, and
interpreted as evidence of lack of merit. Again, this will happen even
when the individuals in a given firm have no hostility or ill-will towards
women or people of color, and believe, in good faith, that they are
208
sincerely committed to advancing women and attorneys of color.
Luckily, employers can institute practices that control for cognitive
209
bias. The goal is not to eliminate bias—which is impossible—but to
teach people what assumptions they need to double-check. An efficient
way to accomplish this in a law firm setting is to require a short training
in the context of performance evaluation, given each year, to introduce
the four basic patterns of gender stereotyping:
1. Prove It Again! When women have to prove their competence
over and over again in order to be judged as competent as men.

205. NAWL, Summit Report, supra note 191, at 20.
206. Alan R. Olson, Subjective Law Firm Compensation Systems, Marketing and Origination, Rep.
to Legal Mgmt., Apr. 2003, at 6, 10 (Altman Weil, Inc.).
207. See, e.g., Gordon Hodson et al., Processes in Racial Discrimination: Differential Weighting of
Conflicting Information, 28 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 460, 460 (2002).
208. See Fiske & Taylor, supra note 145, at 274–79; see also Galen V. Bodenhausen & C. Neil
MacRae, The Self-Regulation of Intergroup Perception: Mechanisms and Consequences of Stereotype
Suppression, in Stereotypes and Stereotyping 227, 227–53 (C. Neil MacRae et al. eds., 1996).
209. Barbara F. Reskin, Employment Discrimination and Its Remedies, in Sourcebook of Labor
Market Research: Evolving Structures and Processes 589–90 (Ivar Berg & Arne L. Kalleberg eds.,
2001) (stating that employers can control cognitive bias); see also Baron & Pfeffer, supra note 47, at
193–94 (same); Bielby, supra note 46, at 126 (detailing the need for such monitoring).
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2. Catch-22: When women face social pressure to play a limited
number of traditionally feminine roles—and encounter pushback
if they do not. Research shows that, too often, women who
conform to traditional roles are liked but not respected, while
women who do not conform are respected but not liked. This is
important for all attorneys, because they all weigh in on others’
advancement and compensation—be it of associates or partners.
3. Maternal Wall: When motherhood triggers strong assumptions
that women are no longer committed or competent.
4. Gender Wars: When gender bias against women turns into
conflicts among the women.
The committee that decides compensation needs additional training to
ensure that they do not penalize women for self-promotion, do not
discount women’s successes, do not award men more compensation
“because they have a family to support,” or award women less
compensation “because they have someone to support them.” Many
programs and consultants are available to provide this training. Another
important resource is the ABA Commission’s Fair Measure: Toward
210
Effective Attorney Evaluations.
In addition, studies show that procedures that require the formal
articulation of reasons for a decision provide a check on bias, because
211
This
people stop and self-check to examine their assumptions.
recommendation poses a challenge for compensation systems that
traditionally have operated in the closet. Unfortunately, that kind of
decisionmaking opens the door wide to unexamined bias, particularly in
an environment in which there are relatively few women, people of color,
or other diverse attorneys. The literature also stresses that putting
someone in charge of diversity who has access to leadership is the single
212
most effective way to achieve diversity.
A minimum first step is to introduce a formal metric, formally
disseminated, that reports the breakdown of women and people of color
in tiers of compensation. This will no doubt be a controversial proposal
213
but, again, “if you’re not keeping score, you’re only practicing.”
8. Ensuring a Process That Does Not Penalize Women for SelfAdvocacy
In firms with effective performance evaluation training, partners will
soon learn that penalizing women for self-promoting when men are not
penalized for the same conduct is gender bias. Firms that fail to do so, at
210. See generally Joan C. Williams & Consuela A. Pinto, ABA Comm’n on Women in the
Prof., Fair Measure: Toward Effective Attorney Evaluations (2d ed. 2008).
211. Alexandra Kalev et al., Best Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy of Corporate
Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies, 71 Am. Soc. Rev. 589, 611–12 (2006).
212. Id.
213. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
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the very least, need to make partners aware that their instincts may be to
find distasteful in women the kind of self-promotion they take for
granted in men. Again, implicit bias will inevitably be a factor affecting
law firm compensation of women and attorneys of color unless and until
the firm makes its partners aware of the need to recognize the kinds of
patterns that commonly arise and to self-correct when they do so.
As noted above, women are often sanctioned for self-advocacy,
particularly by other women. One way to address this is to issue a
memorandum that delineates what is expected and encouraged during
self-advocacy interactions, outlining the type of information required,
and describing what is inappropriate. It is important to have female as
well as male partners discuss this, given that studies show that women
actually are more likely than are men to sanction a woman for self214
The key is to have the partners who are deciding
promotion.
compensation ask: What is my reaction—and would my reaction be the
same if partner ABC (a male partner at the woman partner’s level, not
just an anonymous man) had written the same thing?
9. Conforming to Standard Business Practices by Linking
Compensation to Individuals’ Contributions to the Long-Term
Viability of the Firm
An important point, rarely mentioned, is the current system’s odd
focus on current cash flow. To state the obvious, cash flow differs from
the bottom line, which is a measure of the difference between revenue
flow and expenses. Consultants circle around this when they note that
partners in practice areas with higher profit margins should be rewarded
215
financially. To quote Joel F. Henning Senior Vice President and
General Counsel of Hildebrandt Baker Robbins, Inc: “[v]ery often the
celebrity lawyers . . . will . . . say ‘[t]hey’re not paying me enough money.
I brought in $2 million worth of business.’ I’ll look into it and I’ll often
find that it costs $3 million to bring in that $2 million worth of
216
He also states: “If you measure hours, receipts and
business.”
originations, that doesn’t take into account whether the work is profitable
217
or not.”
Of course, cash flow is easier to measure than bottom line. A
particular challenge faced by law firms is that those who manage them
typically have had no training in how to manage a large business
organization, nor do most law firm partners have an appreciation for

214. Rudman, supra note 114, at 629.
215. Joel A. Rose, Dealing with Tensions Surrounding Partner Compensation, Joel A. Rose &
Assocs., Inc., http://www.joelarose.com/articles/dealing_with_tensions.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2011).
216. Compensation: A Law Firm’s Pandora’s Box: Origination, Profitability and Hours All Add
Up, supra note 169, at 18.
217. Id. at 17.
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what they did not learn when they chose not to go to business school.
The past lack of sophisticated management feeds skepticism about the
219
potential for sophisticated management in the future. The result, notes
Maister, is an absence of trust that leads to “extremely short-term
orientations of many law firms. If partners don’t believe the firm will
remember or value their contributions to future success, why would they
220
make any investment that they may ultimately not get credit for?”
The basic principle is easy to articulate: “Compensation theory
generally says that you ought to be rewarding people for the behaviors
221
that you are trying to elicit . . . ,” notes Henning. The typical approach
in most business settings is to link compensation to the individual’s
222
annual goals, which in turn reflect the organization’s strategic plan.
One survey respondent noted that her firm had instituted such a system
outside of the compensation context: “Individual must meet the specific
written elevation criteria and reflect/support standards set forth in the
firm’s strategic plan.” When asked about what factors into compensation,
other comments offer intriguing hints of systems designed to reward
teamwork: “Cross-office fertilization (ability to generate work for
lawyers in other offices); ability to generate marketing and billable
opportunities for lawyers in other practice groups.”
Law firms’ failure to link partners’ compensation to their
contribution to the long-term viability of the firm has a disproportionate
impact on women, for several reasons. Most important, women lawyers
often are under significant informal pressures to make such
contributions, for example, through service on committees related to
recruitment, associate development, and diversity. In addition, due to a
history of gender discrimination in the profession, women may feel a
greater obligation than do men to mentor other women, and to help
them develop their careers—contributions that help develop a firm’s
human capital but rarely play a significant role when partner
compensation is set.
A straightforward fix is for firms to reward all of the different kinds
of contributions partners are asked to make to the firm, both through
mentoring and other programs, and as well as through committee work.
This theory of compensation would recognize that if the firm requires
partners to make a contribution, it is important enough to the long-term
future of the firm to be recognized when compensation is set. The

218. Maister, supra note 168, at 99–100.
219. Id. at 96.
220. Id. at 98.
221. Compensation: A Law Firm’s Pandora’s Box: Origination, Profitability and Hours All Add
Up, supra note 169, at 3 (quoting Joel F. Henning, Senior Vice President and General Counsel of
Hildebrandt Baker Robbins Inc.).
222. Telephone Interview with Cathy Salvatore, supra note 197.
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inverse would also be true—that if a given type of contribution is not
important enough to recognize when compensation is set, perhaps it is
not important enough to be required.
How these factors are taken into account also matters. For example,
we suspect that most firms represented by lawyers in our survey say that
they take into account, in setting compensation, partners’ contributions
to diversity, associate development, and so on. Yet many of our
respondents were notably skeptical; evidently, many felt that their firms
paid lip service to but did not actually account for such activities to a
significant extent when compensation was set. This finding may indicate
that firms need to communicate better how they actually do take these
types of contributions into account. Alternatively, firms may need to set
up more formal systems than they currently have; it may be that existing
informal recognition (“it’s in the mix; we just don’t quantify it”)
translates good intentions into few results.
More sweeping than a mechanism for adding additional factors into
the mix in setting law firm compensation is to shift to the type of
compensation systems adopted long ago. For example, Ernst & Young’s
compensation system weighs partners in four different arenas: quality,
223
people, markets, and operational excellence.
“Quality” is, quite simply, the quality of the partners’ work—
something rarely considered explicitly in law firm compensation
224
systems. At Ernst & Young, detailed assessments of quality are
225
performed for each major “engagement,” as client matters are called.
“People” concerns whether a partner is “actively involved in
attracting growing and training our people,” said Cathy Salvatore,
Director of Career Development, “because our people are the only thing
226
we have.” Partners can choose how they will contribute to human
capital development of others in the firm: “I tell them, these are the
227
people who are going to pay for your retirement,” Salvatore said. Some
partners choose to focus on recruiting, whether recruiting recent law
228
school graduates or more experienced attorneys. Individuals are given
229
responsibility for recruiting from their alma maters. “They own it. It is
their responsibility to see that we get what we need, and to make sure the
230
relevant professors are happy.” Other partners focus on inclusiveness
and diversity, or serve as Service Program leaders, teaching in-house

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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training programs, and recruiting others to do so. Also included is how
a partner interacts with his or her team: “How are they going to engage
with people on the job? It is very easy for a partner to never be on the
scene—to come in at the beginning, at the end, and other than that only
if there’s a problem. Younger people love to see the partners,” Salvatore
232
noted. But a partner who spent all his or her time with an engagement
team, who was totally invisible at office events and “was not driving
anything cross functionally” would be penalized under the “People”
233
category. The focus is on strategic development: “[H]ow are you
contributing to what E & Y needs to do to make sure we have the
strongest workforce, period—across all accounts not just your
234
account.” A single respondent reported a law-firm system that reflects
some of these concerns: Her firm’s partner compensation took account of
associate evaluations of partners.
“Markets” includes revenue generated, but goes far beyond that: It
measures the extent to which a partner engaged in strategic development
of new markets—not only for him or herself, but also for the firm as a
235
whole. Markets also measures whether the partner has brought in
work, and worked strategically to penetrate new markets or develop new
236
products. One consideration is “account planning—how you prepare to
get your teams ready to deliver whatever service has been contracted
237
for,” Salvatore noted. It also includes strategic work to penetrate a new
market: “Who are we going to go after and how are we going to go after
238
them.”
“Operational excellence” focuses on whether work is performed
239
and revenues are collected efficiently and in a timely manner. So, if a
partner has “a lot of days of revenue sitting uncollected,” or has a
significant number of write-offs, this would show up in the operational
240
Also considered is “fee-sharing”: efficient
excellence metric.
deployment of the person with the relevant skill set, who is closest to the
geographical locale of the engagement. “This discourages partners from
using people they know over and over again because it may be more
241
cost-efficient to use someone closer to the client,” said Salvatore.

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Williams_62-HLJ-597 (Do Not Delete)

February 2011]

4/21/2011 12:19 PM

NEW MILLENNIUM, SAME GLASS CEILING?

673

A straightforward approach would be to adopt this kind of system:
Law firms who inquire will find that many of their larger clients have a
similar system. Firms that feel this is too large a leap could adapt their
current systems by awarding points for a variety of institutional
investments (from management to developing the firm’s human capital).
A third alternative is to set aside a specific percentage of firm profits to
be distributed based on institutional investments.

Conclusion
No compensation system is perfect. But some are awful.

242

243

In 1960, only 38 U.S. law firms had over 50 lawyers. The largest
244
law firm in the United States had only 169 lawyers in 1968. Between
1998 and 2004, the only size category of law firms that increased
appreciably were the largest firms: The number of attorneys working for
245
these firms doubled during that period. By 2008, the average AmLaw
100 firm had 778 lawyers and 183 equity partners; the average AmLaw
246
200 firm had 289 and 92 equity partners.
As law firms have transitioned into the twenty-first century, systems
that served the profession well thirty or sixty years ago are no longer
247
working well. The Great Recession has exacerbated many of the
tensions surrounding law firm compensation by making a broad swath of
law firm partners feel at risk. Several studies have substantiated this fear
and its impact on women, including a survey conducted by Paul Oyer and
Scott Schaefer, which followed over 100,000 lawyers between 2008 and
248
Their findings indicated that “being female increased the
2009.
249
turnover rate by about 7.5%.” However, the trend did not start with
the beginning of the Great Recession. In their study, Reichman and
Sterling recall an interview with a woman partner, who began to notice
gender inequities in partner compensation in the 1980s and “brought
them to the attention of the management committee, who were
242. Winders, supra note 174, at 14.
243. Marc Galanter, “Old and in the Way”: The Coming Demographic Transformation of the Legal
Profession and Its Implications for the Provision of Legal Services, 1999 Wis. L. Rev. 1081, 1090.
244. Marc Galanter & Thomas M. Palay, Why the Big Get Bigger: The Promotion-to-Partner
Tournament and the Growth of Large Law Firms, 76 Va. L. Rev. 747, 749 (1990).
245. George P. Baker & Rachel Parkin, The Changing Structure of the Legal Services Industry and
the Careers of Lawyers, 84 N.C. L. Rev. 1635, 1659 (2006).
246. Aric Press & John O’Connor, Am Law Second Hundred: Steady Does It, Am. Law. (May 30,
2008), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202421806313.
247. See Michele Beardslee et al., Hiring Teams from Rivals: Theory and Evidence on the Evolving
Relationships in the Corporate Legal Market (Feb. 21, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442066 (considering the evolving relationships between clients and law
firms); Burk & McGowan, supra note 10, at 24–33 (discussing the downsizing of Big Law). See
generally Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 Wis. L. Rev. 749.
248. Oyer & Schaefer, supra note 163, at 1.
249. Id. at 15–16.
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‘appalled. They had never thought about it . . . .’”
diversity training, but, for those not at the top,

They introduced

[I]t didn’t get better. . . . I think that the reason . . . . [is that those who
took over were] people [who] tended to be about my age who in some
ways were more threatened by the women being there than the older
partners had been. And who in some ways were more competitive with
everybody including the women and in some ways who saw success by
251
a woman as somehow diminishing them.

The bad news is that existing law firm compensation systems open
the door to gender bias, because they contain tremendous amounts of
subjectivity and lack transparency, and because so much of the
negotiation surrounding origination credit takes place out of sight. In a
profession in which 90% of women lawyers report having encountered
sex discrimination—a percentage that has not decreased since the early
years of women’s entry into the legal profession in the late 1970s—these
252
practices open the door wide to bias and discrimination.
Yet, if that is the bad news, the good news is that many of the
aspects of law firm compensation that present the greatest difficulties for
women are the same elements that knowledgeable management
consultants have identified as outdated and/or not in the best long-term
interests of today’s new, larger law firms. Changing law firms’
compensation systems will not only help diversity, it will enhance the
economic robustness of law firms.

250. Reichman & Sterling, supra note 5, at 43.
251. Id.
252. Noonan, Corcoran & Courant, supra note 13, at 163, 173.
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Appendix
Minority partners were as likely as majority partners to be in onetier partnership systems. Approximately 30% of majority and minority
partners were in firms with one-tier partnership systems.
Roughly two-thirds of majority equity partners’ (70%) and minority
income and equity partners’ (63% and 68%), but only 54% of majority
income partners’ firms used a compensation systems based on levels or
points. In most such systems, the levels or points are reevaluated
annually: 80% of majority equity partners, 71% of majority income
partners, 75% of minority income partners, and 82% of minority equity
partners reported this practice. The remaining firms, with one exception,
reevaluated every two years: 14% of majority equity partners, 10% of
minority, and 4% of majority income partners reported this practice.
Most majority equity partners (76%) reported open compensation
systems, where partnership compensation is disclosed and circulated, 5%
reported closed systems, and 14% reported semi-open systems, where
compensation is available but is not distributed automatically. Among
our majority income-partner respondents, only 48% reported open
systems, while 26% reported closed and 20% semi-closed systems.
Minority partners were in the middle, with 48% reporting open systems,
22% reporting closed systems, and 23% reporting semi-open systems.
Comments indicate that open compensation systems typically are open
only for equity partners.
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